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Preface
When this analysis was begun in 1981, a two-tier ballistic missile
defense system based on conventional rockets was a likely option for reducing
the perceived vulnerability of United States land-based ballistic missiles.
The basing mode of MX missiles was being hotly debated, and for a time it
seemed possible that the MX might not be deployed at all.
Since then, much of the strategic debate appears to have been resolved.
Having found no better basing mode, the Administration (with the support of
Congress) is preparing to place the MX missiles in the Minuteman silos which
were once considered so vulnerable. After President Reagan's "Star Wars"
speech of March 1983, the nation seems ready to develop exotic new defense
systems intended to destroy Soviet ICBMs as they are launched. Such grand
ideas make conventional defense systems intended to destroy warheads late in
their flight appear somewhat dated by comparison. The timeliness of an
analysis of exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense systems (such as the one
described here) might understandably be questioned.
Nevertheless, many of the issues which arise in examining an exo defense
system also arise essentially unchanged in any discussion of exotic systems.
The defense still requires an early warning system to detect an attack in its
early stages. Targets must be identified and correctly assessed in spite of
penetration aids deployed to foil discrimination between real warheads and
decoys. The complete system must be reliable enough under stress to achieve
realistic strategic objectives. Not only do many of the issues remain
unchanged, but the technologies applicable to their solution are often
comparable. For example, detection and discrimination through infrared
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imaging, essential for exoatmospheric defense, is also expected to play a role
in any exotic defense system. Similarly, navigation, guidance, and tracking
technology will be as indispensible for exotic systems as for more
conventional systems. Despite appearances, previous analyses of strategic
doctrine are not immediately made obsolete by the projection of a new doctrine.
Moreover, strategic concepts seem to be cyclic. Often they enjoy a
vogue, then fall into oblivion, only to be resurrected much later. The cycle
appears to span about twenty years. Perhaps this is the interval required for
the cleverness of a "novel" concept to appeal to a new generation unfamiliar
with the inherent fallacies which earlier brought the concept into disrepute.
Many will remember that civil defense was ardently pursued in the early
sixties, only to be forgotten until recently. Likewise, the quest for an
anti-ballistic missile system began even as ballistic missiles were being
developed. Designs relying on ground-based rocket interceptors were later
supplemented with schemes for networks of satellites possibly armed with
microwave or nuclear particle beam weapons. Such efforts were largely
forgotten after the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1973. Many would argue that
the Treaty between the two superpowers was made possible by the mutual
realization that achieveable ABI systems offered little if any strategic
advantage, especially in comparison with their cost. Now, twenty years after
their first appearance, defense systems against ballistic missiles are
attracting interest once again.
Therefore, if some of the analysis which follows appears to be dated, the
analyst may retain some confidence that it may still become relevant for
strategic debates of the future. Unfortunately, we cannot yet look forward
with confidence to the day when such discussions about strategic nuclear
weapons systems become obsolete along with the weapons themselves.
This project was undertaken while I was a part-time Postdoctoral Research
Associate at MIT's Center for International Studies. I wish to thank
Professor Jack Ruina for the opportunity to join the Center in this position,
any my colleagues at the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory for their indulgence
during this partial leave of absence. I am grateful for many informal
discussions with colleagues both at CIS and at Draper, and I am particularly
indebted to Dr. Ashton Carter (who had prepared the Ballistic Missile Defense
analysis for the MX Missile Basing report for the Office of Technology
Assessment) and to Dr. Stephen Weiner of MIT's Lincoln Laboratory.
- y -
67
I. Introduction - The Strategic Context
For almost two decades, US strategic deterrence has rested primarily on
the survivability of its strategic triad. Each of the three independent
nuclear weapons systems which presently make up this triad - the land-based
Minuteman and Titan ICBMs, the submarine-based Poseidon and Trident SLBMS, and
the B-52 strategic bombers (now being armed with cruise missiles) - is
designed and operated so that in some respect it is inherently safe from a
pre-emptive attack. The ICBMs are sheltered in hardened silos, the submarines
are hidden in the oceans, and an important fraction of the bomber force could
escape given early warning of an attack. According to strategic orthodoxy, as
long as each component of the triad is independently survivable, the United
States can remain confident that no surprise attack could disable its
capability for a devastating counterattack.
However, the invulnerability of one of the components of the triad, the
ICBM force, is now being called into question. Until recently, it was
generally accepted that Soviet missiles lacked the accuracy necessary to
destroy US ICBMs in their hardened silos. Recent observations of Soviet
missile tests have suggested to many commentators that new Soviet ICBMs
equipped with powerful and accurate multiple warheads now make it possible in
theory for the Soviets to destroy US ICBMs in a surprise attack. Although not
all commentators agree that the Soviets now have this capability, the accuracy
of US ICBMs is currently being upgraded and a similar Soviet capability cannot
be postponed indefinitely. Whether the Soviets would ever choose to exercise
this capability or whether such an attack would be successful if attempted,
the very threat itsel f is unprecedented and has forced a fundamental
reconsideration of US strategic policy. The concept of an invulnerable
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strategic triad, with the security it offers, will be abandoned only with the
greatest reluctance.
Preserving the survivability of the ICBM force was the goal of the mobile
Multiple Protective Shelter (MPS) deployment scheme proposed for the new MX
missile by the Carter Administration and the Air Force. By multiplying the
number of aim points which the Soviets would have to target, MPS might make it
impractical for the USSR to attack the US ICBM force. This scheme was dropped
by the Reagan Administration for technical and political reasons.
By rejecting the MPS basing scheme while insisting on the preservation of
the ICBM force, the Reagan Administration has deepened an already awkward
dilemma. Other more exotic ideas for preserving ICBMs have been suggested,
including launching the missiles while under attack (which might increase the
risk of an accidental nuclear war), carrying the missiles in small submarines
or aircraft, or burying the missiles in very deep underground shafts.
Closely-Spaced Basing, also called Dense Pack, has been proposed by the
Administration and rejected by Congress. In this scheme, the missile silos
would be so close together that the detonation of one warhead over one silo
would destroy or disable most of the remaining warheads, thus protecting the
other silos. More recently, a Presidential advisory committee has urged the
development of a small mobile missile. Even if it was concluded that such a
missile is a practical solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability, the new
missiles could not be ready for deployment much before 1995. All of these
ideas have serious technical, economic, or political drawbacks. Consequently,
it is becoming likely that the Administration will soon feel itself driven to
deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in support of whatever basing
scheme is adopted for MX.
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Of course, the hope for a defense against ballistic missiles has been
given a new impetus by President Reagan's speech of March 1983, in which he
called for new technology to defend all of the US from a Soviet ballistic
missile attack. A defense based on beam weapons lies far in the future and is
beyond the scope of this report. Still, an exoatmospheric defense system
based on interceptor rockets and able in principle to defend large areas might
be seen by some as a near-term alternative to beam weapons. Such a system
could be extrapolated from the ballistic missile defense system to be
described here.
Since the signing of the ABM Treaty between the US and the USSR (as part
of the SALT I process), most people have considered BMD (as it is now known) a
dead issue. The Treaty, with its 1974 Protocol and additional
understandings, limits ABM deployment to an essentially negligible force on
each side and significantly restricts the development of ABM systems of all
types. Inl principle, the Treaty remains in force indefinitely, but it may be
reviewed and amended at any time by common consent of the US and the USSR.
Periodic reviews are required at five-year intervals; the most recent was
during 1982. Further, the Treaty may be abrogated unilaterally on six months'
notice, a negligible period in terms of the development and deployment of an
ABM system. The ABM Treaty remains in force because whatever strategic
advantages may be perceived for ABM deployment are outweighed by political
costs as well as the implicit threat that the USSR could build its own defense
if the Treaty were abandoned.
Proponents of BMD are often heard to argue against the Treaty that it
enshrines the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the guarantor
of peace in a nuclear world. In the definition of MAD which these proponents
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ascribe to ABM opponents, peace is preserved because each side is held as an
undefended hostage to the other's nuclear weapons. Given this definition, it
would be undesirable to deploy an ABM system because that action would upset
the stable impasse of offensive weapons. Because the proponents find this
concept of MAD unconscionable, they reject any policy they see arising from it.
In fact, opponents of ABM argued2 that MAD was not a strategic doctrine
but an interpretation of the prevailing strategic situation. That the US and
the USSR were hostages to each other's strategic forces was not desirable, it
was unavoidable. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had said in 19673
that if effective means were available to defend US society from Soviet
nuclear forces, it should be deployed. Unfortunately, such means were not
then available, although not for lack of trying. Defending US cities had been
the goal of US ABM technology throughout the 1960s. This technology was
embodied in three ABM systems, Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, and Sentinel. Each of these
was proposed for deployment and rejected on the evidence that it could not
accomplish its assigned mission.
Historically, ABM systems were first developed in the hope of defending
all of the US from a nuclear attack. In an attempt to accomplish this goal,
long-range interceptor missiles such as Nike-Zeus and later Spartan were
developed. These carried large nuclear warheads to destroy attacking warheads
at high altitudes before they re-entered the atmosphere. In addition, the
Sprint missile which carried a smaller nuclear warhead was developed to allow
interceptions after the warheads re-entered but before they reached their
targets. Such systems required powerful radars which could reach the
necessary ranges for detection and tracking, in spite of disruptions such as
nuclear fireballs and distractions such as decoys and chaff. Still, the goal
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of defending soft targets such as cities from a sophisticated ICBM attack has
been elusive. A soft target can be devastated by a large nuclear weapon even
if it is detonated at a range of up to ten miles. Major cities are such
priceless strategic targets that to be effective the defense must be virtually
impenetrable. It is now generally accepted even by BMD proponents4 that an
effective ABM defense of cities is not possible in the near future, and this
conclusion is the principal technical basis for the ABM Treaty.
The development of ABM for area defense climaxed in 1967, late in the
Johnson Administration, with the announcement of the Sentinel ABM system.
Because a general defense against a sophisticated Soviet attack was officially
acknowledged to be unfeasible, Sentinel was directed against the improbable
threat of an unsophisticated Chinese ICBM attack. When the Nixon
Administration took office in 1969, the Sentinel program was modified and
renamed Safeguard. The Safeguard program was intended to defend US ICBMs
against a light Soviet attack. However, Safeguard was no more credible in
this new role than Sentinel had been in its earlier role. All of the
available components for Safeguard, such as radars and missiles, had been
developed for area defense and were not optimal for ICBM defense. Safeguard
deployment was overtaken by the ABM Treaty, and the only Safeguard site to be
completed was closed in 1976.
Nevertheless, research and development for BMD has continued within the
constraints imposed by the Treaty. By remaining current in BMD technology,
the US hopes to discourage the USSR from renouncing the Treaty and deploying
its own systems. The US also remains ready to deploy BMD if the technology
warrants it and if the strategic situation requires it.
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The main goal of this continuing program has been the defense of hard
targets, such as Minuteman ICBM silos. Compared with city defense, hard
target defense is much less demanding. An incoming re-entry vehicle (RV) can
be allowed to come within about a mile of a defended hard target before it is
intercepted. This makes it possible to deploy a defense system for which the
range of the interceptor is reduced and a less powerful and expensive radar is
required. Also, the discrimination between true RVs and decoys becomes very
much easier at low altitudes due to the sorting effect of atmospheric drag.
Finally, since only a fraction of the ICBM force must be preserved to ensure
deterrence, the defense system can tolerate moderate "leakage".
The Site Defense Program which followed the signing of the ABM Treaty led
to a system designed to defend a cluster of hard targets such as Minuteman
silos. It called for an interceptor with a range of several miles, shorter
than that for Sprint but still long enough to defend several Minuteman silos
simul taneously. The data from several radars could be combined or "netted" to
circumvent the disruption of nuclear fireballs. Faster commercial computers
which could cope with the huge volume of data to be handled in real time were
integrated into the system.
The Low Altitude Defense System (LoADS)5 was specifically designed for
the defense of MX missiles in an MPS basing mode, but MPS was cancelled before
the LoADS system was actually developed. The design called for a small ,
short-range interceptor with a nuclear warhead of several kilotons, and a
correspondingly small phased-array radar. A LoADS defense unit (with several
interceptors to defend both itself and the MX missile) would be placed in a
shelter next to the shelter occupied by the missile. In order to stay close
to the missile without disclosing its location, the LoADS unit itself would
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have to be mobile and deceptively based. Deceptive mobile basing of the
defense therefore served two distinct but coincident functions for this
deployment. First, the offense could not attempt to destroy the defense unit
before attacking the MX missile because the location of the defense unit would
be hidden. Second, the defense unit would not give away the location of the
missile it defended.
Under the new name Sentry, the LoADS design remains the most likely
candidate for an endoatmospheric hard target defense system.
The short range of a terminal defense system has the disadvantage that
each individual hard target or cluster of hard targets requires a separate
complete defense system (unless the defense is mobile and deceptively based).
Alternatively, one long-range "area" defense system could defend many targets
(hard or soft) simultaneously. The defense then has the option of using all
of its resources to defend only a fraction of its defended targets. For
example, the defense could choose to defend a subset of the ICBM force large
enough to ensure retaliation after an attack, allowing the remaining ICBMs to
be destroyed. Since the attacker would not know in advance which targets
would be defended, he would have to structure his attack on the assumption
that all of the targets would be defended fully. This "preferential defense"
is a form of "leverage" because it requires the attacker to allocate large
offensive resources to overcome smaller defensive resources.
In spite of its potential advantages, area defense of hard targets has
been impeded by many of the difficulties which forestall population defense.
The example of the Spartan missile illustrates this. Originally designed as a
long-range interceptor for the Sentinel area defense system, it was later
incorporated into the Safeguard ICBM defense system. To operate at long
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range, Spartan required a powerful ground-based radar which was both costly
and vulnerable. It could be disabled by direct attack or by blackout from
nuclear fireballs in the atmosphere. The large nuclear warhead carried by the
Spartan missile might itself contribute to blackout. The radar apparently had
little capability for discriminating RVs from decoys before they- re-entered
the atmosphere. Presumably, this was not considered necessary, either because
few decoys were expected or because a large well-placed warhead could destroy
several RVs simultaneously. These considerations made Spartan an unconvincing
defense system. The subsequent development of multiple re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs) and sophisticated penetration aids (penaids) has since made
exoatmospheric defense even more difficult.
BMD proponents now suggest that novel optical technology and non-nuclear
kill (NNK) can overcome these problems. Ground-based radars could be replaced
by optical sensors lofted above the atmosphere. Incoming RVs could be
destroyed individually by many small rockets called kill vehicles (KVs)
carried by one interceptor in place of a nuclear warhead. Since the
exoatmospheric engagement takes place above the atmosphere before the RVs
re-enter, several minutes are available to detect, track, intercept, and
destroy the RVs, rather than the several seconds available for engagements in
endoatmospheric defense.
Further, this exoatmospheric area defense system might be supported by an
endoatmospheric terminal defense system such as LoADs to form a layered
system. The attraction of the layered system in simple terms is that the
leakage rates for the two systems might be multiplicative. For example, if
each of the two component systems had a 20% leakage rate, the combined systems
might have an overall leakage rate of 4%, according to proponents.6 In
- 9 -
special cases, the two component systems might be synergistic, mutually
supporting each other so that each is more efficient in combination than alone.
Congress has directed the Administration to produce a permanent plan for
basing the MX missile; a basing plan which includes BMD has been among the
options considered. Defending the existing Minutemen ICBMs is another
possibility, but apparently it has not been considered. It is generally
accepted that present terminal defense technology is adequate to allow
deployment of a system such as LoADs with relatively low technical risk. On
the other hand, the development of exoatmospheric defense has received much
less emphasis, that is, only about 5-7% of the total BMD budget in recent
years (about $350-450 million since 1966).8 The new exoatmospheric
technology has not been fully tested and will continue to represent a much
greater technical risk during the next few years. If the Administration
chooses to deploy BMD, it may choose to deploy a terminal system alone,
deferring any decision on the exoatmospheric "overlay", or it may choose to
develop and deploy both the terminal system and the overlay simultaneously,
accepting the risk associated with the overlay development.
In either case, the utility of the endoatmospheric system may ultimately
depend critically on the performance of the overlay, whenever it is deployed.
Consequently, a decision to deploy an endo system alone at least partially
presupposes the eventual successful development of an exoatmospheric system.
The potential availability of two very different types of BMD presents
several options for BMD deployment, namely:
1) endo only;
2) endo-exo (endo dominates);
3) endo-exo (exo dominates);
4) exo only.
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The success of an endo only defense may depend critically on the basing
scheme for the ICBMs it defends. For example, an endoatmospheric defense
system such as LoADS was attractive while MPS was a viable basing option for
MX because it very effectively utilized the concept of leverage. Because each
of the 200 MX missiles would be hidden in any one of 23 shelters, the Soviets
would have to aim at least one RV at each of these shelters to ensure
destroying the missile. Thus MPS would force a ratio of at least 23 RVs per
MX destroyed, for a total of 4600 RVs. If a LoADS unit were also hidden among
the shelters, its interceptors could shoot down the RVs aimed at the shelters
containing the MX and the LoADS unit while ignoring the remaining RVs. Then
the Soviets would be obliged to aim at least two RVs at every shelter, one to
draw the defense and the second to destroy the missile. The presence of LoADS
effectively doubles the already large number of RVs necessary to destroy the
MX missiles. The performance of LoADS need not be very high to enforce this
advantage. It is strategically effective if the system can destroy merely 50%
or more of the RVs it is assigned to intercept. The key feature of this
scheme is that MPS basing and deceptively based defense operate
synergistically to gain leverage that neither enjoys alone. MPS basing
reduces the number of RVs attacking each target to a level where a relatively
simple defense system can gain additional leverage.
In the absence of MPS basing for MX, the Soviets will be able to target
their RVs much more densely. For example, it is conceivable that by 1990 the
Soviets might be willing to aim as many as eight warheads at each of 1000
Minuteman missile silos, should they chose to expand their arsenal as the US
expands its own. (One reason given for dropping MPS was that the Soviets
might be willing to aim as many as 9200 RVs against it.) In this situation,
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Figure 1 - US Army Scenario for Exoatmospheric Ballistic Missile Defense
(Public Affairs Office, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization)
1.E
RADAR ICBM
LAYERED DEFENSE SYSTEM
A Layered Defense concept combines many of the BMD program's major
thrusts. The artist's conception above depicts a typical two-tier BMD scenario.
After early warning is received, probes carrying optical sensors would be the
first element of a Layered Defense to acquire attacking ICBMs. Next, the
"overlay's" optically guided "exo" interceptors thin the attack with their
nonnuclear warheads, destroying many of the attackers above the atmosphere.
The remainder of the attack is engaged by the "endo" low altitude interceptors
of the terminal defense "underlay."
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the endo system must be capable of destroying all eight RVs in order to
protect the silo. Unless the endo system is deceptively based or given a long
range to cover more than one missile silo simultaneously (an option which
provides leverage but places difficult and expensive requirements on the
system radar and interceptors), eight interceptors must be provided for each
of the 1000 silos. To be sure of destroying all eight RVs with adequate
confidence, the reliability of destroying any one RV must be quite high.
Further, the offense may attempt to overcome the defense by adjusting
tactics. For instance, the offense may detonate several warheads in quick
succession above the defensive radar sites (in a so-called "ladder attack"),
thus momentarily blinding the radars while later RVs sneak through to destroy
the defended missile silos.
To discourage such tactics, the US might be willing to deploy a light
exoatmospheric defense system above the endo system. This overlay would
attempt to break up the coordination of a dense attack, operating
synergistically in support of the endo system. The endo system would still be
almost as elaborate as before in order to defend against all the remaining
RVs. The overlay in this case is added to the endo defense essentially to
allow the endo defense to operate as intended.
Alternatively, the exo system might be designed to destroy most of the
incoming RVs, leaving only a few leakers to be swept up by a much lighter endo
system below. The exo system with its much greater range can defend many
silos simultaneously from one defense site, thus offering considerable
leverage through preferential defense. Nevertheless, if the exo system is to
carry the major burden of defense, it must achieve a high level of performance
in order to assure the preservation of the ICBM force in the face of a dense
Soviet attack.
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Because the endo system is technically more advanced and because the
performance requirements on an exo system would be very high in the absence of
any supporting endo system, the option of deploying an exo system alone does
not appear to be given serious consideration.
The evaluation of BMD performance for each of these deployments depends
critically on the composition of a postulated Soviet attack. If the Soviets
were willing to attack the ICBM force at all, one must presume that they would
be willing to pay the price necessary to destroy it. Deploying a BMD system
might indeed raise this price by a calculable amount, obliging the Soviets to
divert warheads from other targets or to build more warheads, but it may not
dissuade them from attacking unless the BMD system were convincingly
unassail able.
While the Reagan Administration remains committed to the deployment of
the MX missile, ICBM vulnerability remains a key issue to be resolved, and the
outcome of the debate is unpredictable. In view of these immminent strategic
decisions, it is timely to examine the technical basis for exoatmospheric
ballistic missile defense.
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II. A Scenario for Exoatmospheric Ballistic Missile Defense
The entire flight of an ICBM lasts only about 30 minutes. The boost
phase requires about 2 minutes, lifting the missile payload out of the
atmosphere and giving it most of the velocity required to reach its targets.
Shortly after the booster rocket falls behind, the MIRY "bus", under control
of the guidance system, sequentially adds increments of velocity and deploys
each of its re-entry vehicles (Rs). In the course of this RV deployment, the
bus may also deploy a variety of penetration aids for confusing the defense.
The booster itself may be exploded into fragments to add to the confusion.
All these objects travel in ballistic trajectories for approximately
20 minutes before they re-enter the atmosphere. At re-entry, almost all the
light material accompanying the RVs (booster fragments and penetration aids)
are quickly retarded and destroyed by the friction of the atmosphere. The
heavy RVs plunge through the atmosphere to their targets in less than a minute.
A possible exo defense scenario is described in official Army BMD public
relations literature. 9 One should recognize that this is not the only
possible scenario; alternative scenarios can readily be imagined. Exo defense
technology is still so far from maturity that the final form of an exo defense
remains largely speculative. Nevertheless, this official scenario illuminates
the basic features of exo defense and forms the basis for the analysis which
follows.
About ten minutes before the arrival of the first RVs, the US
exoatmospheric defense system would launch several "probes" into ballistic
trajectories above the atmosphere. Since the launch and positioning of the
probes would itself require about three minutes, the probes would have about
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five minutes to assess the attack in detail and call for appropriate defense
measures. The trajectories of the probes would allow them to remain above the
atmosphere for several minutes in order to view and assess an extended
attack. The probes would carry infrared telescopes with sensors in three
optical bands to gather data on the trajectories and emissions of each of the
objects making up the attack. The computed trajectories would indicate the
targets under attack and allow calculation of intercept trajectories. The
infrared emissions would indicate the surface temperature of each object,
providing clues for separating the RVs from all the penetration aids. The
massive RVs would tend to maintain their temperature and therefore their
infrared emission would tend to remain constant; all the lighter objects would
tend to cool more rapidly to the equilibrium temperature of space.
As the RVs approach re-entry, interceptor rockets would be launched to
meet them. Each interceptor would carry ten or more "kill vehicles" (KVs),
small rockets with separate guidance systems which would be deployed after the
interceptor leaves the atmosphere. Each KV would be assigned an RV within its
range. The KV would home on its assigned RV and destroy it either by direct
collision or with conventional explosives.
Because the probe's sensors would generate huge amounts of data, the
probe would carry a sophisticated computer to process the raw data before
transmitting it back to the ground. In fact, plans call for special mobile
cryogenic computers capable of 40 million instructions per second (MIPS); for
comparison, the Cray 1 or Cyber 205 "super computers" which are now available
for earth-based applications are capable of about 100 MIPS .
The entire defense would be co-ordinated by a large ground-based
commercial computer called the Battle Manager which would be equipped with the
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interfaces necessary to communicate with the early warning systems, the
probes, and the interceptors, and with the human operators who ultimately
supervise the system.
A key feature of this system which distinguishes it from all earlier ABM
systems is the reliance on non-nuclear kill (NNK). As noted earlier, the
Spartan exoatmospheric system destroyed RVs by exploding a large thermonuclear
warhead. The resulting flux of thermal x-rays could be expected to damage RVs
even at a distance of about 10 kilometers, so the guidance accuracy required
for Spartan was not great. The new system avoids the use of nuclear warheads,
but in order to destroy the incoming RVs the system must be able to place the
KVs within a few feet of their targets.
Still, achieving this goal offers great rewards.10 The system avoids
the political problems encountered in producing and deploying large numbers of
additional nuclear weapons. It does not draw on short supplies of critical
nuclear materials. The interceptors could be launched without the need for
Nuclear Release Authority (NRA) in the tense moments at the start of a nuclear
attack. The system would not need to protect itself from the effects of its
own nuclear explosions (self-induced effects). Finally, the system could be
tested without violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (although the ABM Treaty
may be another matter).
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III. Generic Features of an Exo Defense System
On the basis of the foregoing scenario, one can identify the following
functions which are implicit in exoatmospheric defense:
1) Preferential defense (in specific circumstances);
2) Early warning;
3) Passive infrared tracking;
4) Discrimination;
5) Tracking and discrimination combined: The forward acqusition system;
6) Multiple kill vehicles;
7) Computation and battle management;
8) Communications.
It must be remembered that the success of exo defense depends on the
successful operation and coordination of every one of these concepts.
While each function is vital to exoatmospheric defense as it is currently
being described, some of the functions are more easily accommodated in system
design than others. These key functions are described below, each with a
brief assessment of its significance for exoatmospheric system development.
1) Preferential defense. A system defending ICBMs must preserve only a
fraction of the ICBM silos in order to ensure a retaliatory capability. The
defense maximizes its efficiency by concentrating all its resources on
defending a fraction of the silos, allowing the remainder to be destroyed.
Since the offense does not know in advance which silos are being defended, a
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large increase in offensive resources is required to offset a small increase
in defensive resources.
Preferential defense presupposes that the defense can afford to sacrifice
a major fraction of its ICBM silos. In addition to losing all the undefended
silos, the defense must also expect to lose some of the defended silos as a
consequence of unavoidable leakage. (Tolerance of controlled leakage is one
of the features which distinguishes point defense of silos from area defense
of cities.) The defense must therefore manage its preferential defense
strategy in such a manner that after sacrificing some silos outright and
losing others to leakage, it still retains enough ICBMs for a credible
counterattack.
As a simple example, assume the US wishes to guarantee the survival of
400 EMT (equivalent megatons) in its ICBM force after a Soviet attack. (For
warheads with yields of less than a megaton, the equivalent megatonnage of the
warhead is the square root of the actual megatonnage.) The surviving 400 EMT
could be represented by 75 MX missiles, each with 10 warheads of 0.3 MT each.
If the US possessed 200 MX missiles, and expected 25 to be lost to leakage
during an attack, then preferential defense could be exercised to sacrifice
100 MX missiles while defending 100, so that about 75 missiles would remain.
The Soviets would be obliged to assume that all of the 200 missiles were fully
defended. On the other hand, if the US possessed only 100 MX missiles (and
nothing else . . .), it could not afford to sacrifice any of the missiles
outright, and no advantage could be gained from preferential defense.
Preferential defense therefore depends on the availability of targets
which can be sacrificed. If 1000 Minuteman missiles were protected by an exo
BMD system, perhaps half of these could be sacrificed while still preserving a
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credible deterrent. On the other hand, if 100 MX missiles were protected,
probably all must be defended, and preferential defense is nullified.
Additional MX missiles might be deployed in anticipation of their eventual
sacrifice, but the cost would probably be prohibitive. In other words,
preferential defense would not be cost-effective where additional ICBMs must
be deployed to make it viable. Alternatively, the ICBMs might be deployed in
an MPS basing mode in which the empty shelters could be sacrificed. Even so,
the additional shelters might be so costly that the cost of preferential
defense would become prohibitive.
Further, the operation of preferential defense is not straightforward,
because the offense may adopt tactics to nullify it. In particular, the
offense may choose to spread its attack over time so that the defense cannot
assess the full attack before it is obliged to commit its interceptors. Then
the defense cannot assume that the offense's RVs are evenly distributed over
all the targets, and must resort to a technique called adaptive preferential
defense which considerably dilutes the advantage of preferential defense. On
the other hand, while extending its attack, the offense must hope that the
defended missiles cannot be launched in retaliation before the extended attack
is complete. The MX missile is in fact being designed to fly out through the
debris of a nuclear attack, insofar as that is possible.
2) Early wnin. The system launches its interceptors from ground
level and makes its intercepts above the atmosphere. Hence several minutes'
warning must be provided from an external warning system.
The tremendous heat generated by the ICBM boosters would be detected
immediately by the infrared (IR) sensors aboard geostationary satellites of
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the type expected to be deployed by the US in the late 1980s. These
satellites would quickly alert US forces of the impending attack. Further,
they could provide general information about the size of the attack (for
example, the number of ICBMs launched), although they would not be able to
discern the intended targets of the missiles. Since some of these satellites
would be in high geostationary orbits, the USSR could not easily disable them
without alerting the US to the danger of an attack. Nevertheless, should the
satellite network fail, the US might still depend on warning from the
ground-based radars of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS).
The requirement for'early warning to ensure the survivability of the ICBM
force establishes a common failure mode for both the ICBM force and the bomber
force. Already the bomber force requires early warning to allow the bombers
to escape under attack from their vulnerable fixed bases. If the ICBM force
becomes dependent on an exo BMD system for its survivability, and if in turn
the exo system depends on early warning to initiate its defense, then a
failure of the early warning system simultaneously places both forces in
jeopardy. The deployment of BMD therefore makes the survivability of the
early warning system even more critical.
The early warning satellites could detect the launch of Soviet ICBMs and
therefore provide about 30 minutes' warning of an attack. In their high
orbits, the satellites would be relatively immune from surprise attack.
Several kinds of attack can be imagined. A direct-ascent rocket attack could
be observed and reported as it is launched and at least 1/2 hour (probably
much longer) before it could reach a satellite in high orbit. A ground-based
laser attack would be instantaneous, but the distance between laser and
satellite would make it difficult to concentrate the laser beam on its
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target. Also, the satellite could be hardened to withstand such attacks. Yet
another possibility is that the Soviets might station anti-satellite
satellites close to strategically important US satellites, in order to be able
to destroy them quickly in a surprise attack.
Ground-based radars (BMEWS) can also provide early warning of a Soviet
attack, but only after Soviet RVs rise high in their trajectories, perhaps
15 minutes after launch. This would leave a much smaller interval of about
15 minutes in which to carry out the defense, and the exo system must be
carefully constructed to ensure its ability to respond on such short notice.
The radars themselves are vulnerable to surprise attack either by SLBMs or by
low-flying aircraft.
While it is hard to imagine a surprise attack capable of neutralizing
both satellites and radars without giving any warning, early warning might be
systematically suppressed in a protracted nuclear war (such as envisioned by
the present Administration). With difficulty, one can imagine improbable
scenarios in which the Soviets carefully destroy critical components of the
early warning network without provoking a response from US ICBMs. Then the
ICBM force would remain in its shelters, unprotected by the exo system which
would be paralyzed without early warning.
Even in peacetime, the early warning system is the most exposed and
vulnerable part of the defense system. Both the US and the USSR indulge in a
habit known as "tweaking", in which the surveillance sytems of the opposing
side are carefully teased to elicit a response. The responses to tweaking
provide valuable intelligence on the capabilities of these systems, which in
turn can be used to devise strategies for overcoming them in time of war.
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3) Passive infrared tracking. The incoming warheads must be tracked to
compute target points and interception trajectories. In place of ground-based
radars which are vulnerable to direct attack and nuclear blackout, the exo
system uses a rocket-borne optical system. Lofted radars are thought to be
too cumbersome for this mission and would have poor angular resolution. Since
the RVs may be eclipsed by the earth's shadow, the intrinsic thermal emission
of the RVs, which peaks in the infrared, is the only reliable emission for
tracking. Only the angular position of the RV with respect to the sensor can
be measured directly by such a passive system. A range measurement would
require an active component such as a pulsed laser, but the distances to be
measured are too great for successful ranging.
Tracking serves several purposes in exo defense. At a minimum, tracking
accuracy must be sufficient to allow the computation of trajectories for the
interceptors and to permit the individual KVs to acquire their targets. Also,
if the exo system is exercising preferential defense (in which not all of the
ICBM silos are defended), then the intended target of each individual RV must
be determined in order to decide whether that RY should be intercepted or
ignored.
The precision of angular measurements is limited ultimately by optical
diffraction in the inevitable presence of noise. Although the system relies
on long infrared wavelengths (5-20 micrometers) and the aperture of the
observing optics is limited (less than 0.5 meters), it is possible to
contemplate resolution approaching 20 microradians. This angular resolution
corresponds to a length of 20 meters at a range of 1000 kilometers.
A distinction should be made between resolution and accuracy. Even if an
object is not resolved, its angular position can be measured to a precision
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within a small fraction of its image diameter or within a fraction of a
digital picture element. Careful engineering analysis is necessary to match
the optical imaging properties of the system to its digital sampling
properties. Accuracy also implies that the object can be located in an
absolute frame of reference. Optical distortions must be compensated, and the
optical system itself must be carefully stabilized. (Stabilization can be
aided by observing the positions of known astronomical objects within the
probe's field of view.)
In order to derive a complete track in three dimensions, the range from
the probe to each object must-be inferred somehow from the angular
measurements. Two methods have been suggested for ranging.
The first method relies on the angular rate at which the object deviates
from a straight-line trajectory under the known influence of gravity. Only
one probe is required for gravitational ranging, but the uncertainty
achievable appears to be greater than several hundred meters in range during
flight.
(The accuracy of this technique is known to be compromised when both the
probe and the observed object are subject to the same acceleration due to
gravity. It has been suggested that the probe should be equipped with a small
sustainer rocket to provide an acceleration difference and also to maintain
the probe aloft for a longer period.)
The second method requires at least two separate probes to determine the
range by triangulation (parallax). Since the probes must sight along almost
parallel paths, the accuracy of the inferred range will not be as great as the
accuracy of the two cross-range co-ordinates. Nevertheless, range accuracies
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of about 50 meters can be envisioned. The increased accuracy of triangulation
over gravitational ranging appears to make it the method of choice.
The velocity of each object may also be inferred from several successive
measurements of object position in three dimensions.
If two or more probes are launched, an additional task will be to catalog
all the approaching objects so that the images of each object from the
separate probes are correctly associated with one another. Since at first
only angular positions are known, the position of an object in three
dimensions is not certain; each object can be localized only along a radial
centered on a particular probe. It will be necessary to search out sets of
radials which cross in space, thus fixing the location of individual objects.
Searching all the possible combinations systematically will require
considerable computer effort, and ambiguities may persist. Gravitational
ranging may contribute preliminary range estimates to aid the sorting
algorithm, but a period of several minutes would be required to observe the
curvature of the trajectories before ranges can be estimated with any accuracy.
By extrapolating forward in time from the current position and velocity
of each object, the system can calculate its impact point. The cross-range
error of such an estimate can be quite small, because it does not depend
heavily on the inferred ranges. The down-range error is significantly larger,
first because it is very dependent on the inferred ranges (with their larger
errors), and second because the RV approaches its ground target at an angle of
about 23 degrees to the horizontal, thus magnifying the range errors. One may
conjecture that the cross-range error for impact point prediction can be
reduced to about 100 meters, while the down-range error may be about 500
meters.
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In addition to extrapolating forward from the probe observations, the
system may also extrapolate backwards. Even though the extrapolation interval
is larger than for impact point prediction, the observation accuracies
suggested above may make it possible for the system to determine how each
individual object was deployed from its MIRV bus. It is not clear whether
this information would be useful to the defense, but it may aid the system in
discriminating between RVs and decoys, or it may limit the offense's range of
tactics.
Impact point prediction of this accuracy enforces a major constraint on
the offense: In order to be convincing, the decoys must be aimed accurately at
defended targets. Deploying each true RV requires repositioning the MIRV bus,
so the offense must allow sufficient fuel and time for each such maneuver.
Since the offense must deploy several decoys for each true RV, separately
targeting each decoy becomes prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the offense
is likely to deploy with each true RV a package of decoys which travel
ballistically in echelon around it. The decoys must be spaced closely enough
so that each realistically threatens the target, yet far enough apart so that
it would be impossible to destroy more than one object (RV or decoy) with one
KV. Consequently, the defense confronts many clusters of objects, each
cluster typically including one RV and several decoys. These clusters, called
closely-spaced objects or CSOs, are dense enough that they may not be resolved
into separate objects when they are first detected by the probe at long
range. The defense must detect these clusters, track them initially as
unresolved images, resolve them into individual objects as they approach, and
finally select which objects to attack as presumed RVs.
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Impact point prediction, and discrimination and preferential defense
insofar as they depend on it, would be compromised if the attacking RVs can
maneuver after they are tracked. Then the defense could not assume that an RV
was aimed at a target it was approaching ballistically. Discrimination by
impact point prediction would be risky because an RV which appeared likely to
miss its target might later maneuver to hit it. Preferential defense would
also be risky because an RV approaching a target the defense is willing to
sacrifice might maneuver to hit a defended target. The spacing of targets is
critical in this context, because the range of maneuverability is certain to
be limited. Thus closely spaced silos would allow easy re-targeting, but the
10 kilometer spacing of the Minuteman silos makes re-targeting a more
questionable tactic for the offense.
The US has already conducted several programs to develop maneuvering
RVs. Some of these were specifically intended to overcome BMD systems. The
British recently revealed the Chevaline re-entry system which is intended to
enable British Polaris warheads to penetrate the ABN system protecting Moscow.
Whether the RVs maneuver aerodynamically during re-entry, or whether they
are equipped with with small jets for maneuvering just before re-entry,
maneuverability will probably exact a large weight penalty on the RV design.
Consequently, the offense is not likely to resort to maneuvering RVs unless
they promise to accomplish a specific mission, such as overcoming a particular
BND system. On the other hand, the designer of a defense system must ensure
that it cannot easily be neutralized if the offense consequently chooses to
deploy maneuvering RVs.
The offense may choose to develop an alternative decoy strategy. Each
decoy might be equipped with a small maneuvering rocket and a simple guidance
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system. After it is dispensed from the decoy package accompanying each RV,
the individual decoy would place itself on a slightly different course to a
different target according to programmed instructions. Of course, the decoy
guidance could not be as accurate as the guidance of the MIRV bus which aims
the real RVs. If the RVs were aimed at targets several hundred miles apart,
the decoys could not be aimed accurately at separate targets. However, if the
RVs were aimed at ICBM silos only a few miles apart, only a small increment of
velocity need be applied to the decoys and therefore only modest accuracy is
required of the decoy guidance to threaten other silos convincingly. Perhaps
not all decoys would be accurately positioned, but the offense might be
willing to allow the defense to discriminate against some decoys on the basis
of impact point prediction if the corresponding relaxation of guidance
requirements would simplify decoy design.
If the offense repositioned decoys immediately after they were dispensed
by the RV, the defense (as noted earlier) might be able to reconstruct the
deployment by backward extrapolation of tracking data and use this information
for discrimination. However, the decoys may reposition themselves at any time
during the interval from their deployment until they can be seen by the
defense's sensors, although decoy guidance will tend to drift with delay. It
is therefore likely that if the offense found it necessary to do so, it could
confound the defense's efforts to reconstruct decoy deployment.
4) Discrimination. The RVs will almost certainly be accompanied by a
variety of penetration aids in large numbers. To avoid exhausting the supply
of kill vehicles on inert targets, the defense system must be able to
distinguish RVs from decoys. Decoy design is a compromise between utility in
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penetrating the defense and the weight penalty imposed by the decoys (and
other penetration aids). To be useful, decoys must be much lighter than the
RVs they imitate, although successful decoys are worth a considerable
sacrifice in RV payload. As an example for perspective, if a typical RV
weighs about 1000 kilograms, the offense may consider it worthwhile to employ
several decoys per RV, each weighing about 10 kg.
Decoys are useful to the offense only if it is easier to deploy more
decoys than it is for the defense to deploy more KVs. Although this is likely
always to be true, if the defense could design a very light, very inexpensive
kill vehicle, then the offense's decoy strategy could be outflanked.
The current basis for discrimination is the anticipated difference in
infrared emission between RVs and decoys. (Discrimination by other means,
such as radar or lasers, may be precluded given the long ranges of an exo
engagement.) For thermal discrimination, an observer uses measurements of an
object's radiation at several wavelengths to infer an object's temperature,
and then uses variations in temperature to infer the object's mass. In
principle, a lightweight decoy will show rapid variations in its thermal
radiations while a massive RV will show recognizably more stability.
A key to understanding the basis of thermal discrimination is the concept
of thermal inertia, an obvious analogy with the concept of physical inertia.
According to Newton's First Law of Motion, an object at rest tends to stay at
rest while an object in motion tends to remain in motion; this is the
principle of inertia. Newton's Second Law of Motion states that the more
massive an object, the more force is required to modify its motion.
Therefore, an object's mass is an exact measure of its inertia, and vice
versa. In an analogous way, the heat capacity of an object (its thermal mass)
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is a measure of the amount of thermal energy needed to change its temperature
(its thermal inertia). Thermally massive objects tend to take longer to heat
or cool to match their surroundings. It is reasonable to suppose that thermal
mass is correlated with physical mass, but the correlation is poor. For
example, a given volume of metal has a much greater physical mass but much
less heat capacity than an equivalent volume of water.
Objects in space exchange heat with their surroundings by thermal
radiation, and the radiation from an object can be observed and interpreted as
a measure of the object's temperature. Warm objects tend to radiate more
rapidly and at shorter wavelengths than cool objects. Here again, however,
the correlation is not exact, but depends on the nature of the object's
surface.
In the official exo scenario, the exo system would make observations at
three wavelengths. BMD proponents assert that a three-band temperature
measuring scheme is immune from deception. It is further asserted that decoy
designs have already been tested and shown to be ineffective against the
discrimination algorithms developed for exo defense. No details of either the
decoy designs or the discrimination algorithms have been given publicly,
however.
It should be remembered that not only will the decoy imitate the RV, but
the RV will also be re-designed so that the two are mutually imitative.
Naturally, the specific function of the RV cannot be compromised by this
re-design. On the other hand, there is no point in insisting on an ideal RV
if it can easily be detected and destroyed by the defense. The offense will
therefore design the decoys and modify the RVs to optimize the attack with
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respect to its overall performance against the defended targets, taking into
account the need to foil the defense's discrimination.
The physical principles on which thermal discrimination is based are
described in most elementary physics textbooks. Important considerations for
successful discrimination are: 1) the thermal emissions of the attacking
objects; 2) the observations made by the defense; 3) competing sources of
infrared radiation; and 4) the likely deception techniques the offense may use
against the defense.
The defense will attempt to discriminate between RVs and decoys by
observing the response of these objects to transients in their surroundings.
Presumably, the lighter decoys will approach equilibrium more quickly than the
more massive RVs. Two such transients are important: first, the launch of the
objects from the ambient temperature of the ICBM silos to their equilibrium
temperature in near-earth space, and second, the transit into or out of the
earth's shadow which may occur at some point in a polar trajectory. The first
transient is unavoidable, but its effects may be minimized by designing both
RVs and decoys to be in radiational equilibrium with their near-earth
surroundings at a temperature of about 300 0K. In any case, this transient
takes place early in the flight of the attacking objects, leaving a period of
perhaps 15-20 minutes for RVs and decoys to approach equilibrium before they
can be observed by the defense. The transit of the earth's limb depends on
both the time of day and the season of the year. The transit, if it occurs,
could be in either direction, from sunlight to shadow or from shadow to
sunlight. Ideally, from the defense point of view, the transit would take
place while the defense can observe it, thus maximizing transient effects for
discrimination. The offense, depending on the circumstances of the attack,
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may have the option of scheduling the attack to avoid offering this advantage
to the defense.
Less pronounced transients would be caused by changes in the radiation
from the earth below as the objects pass over land masses, the polar ice cap,
clouds, etc.
The thermal emission from an object is governed by Planck's blackbody
radiation law. Typical blackbody radiation curves are illustrated in the
accompanying figure. They indicate that thermal emission peaks at a certain
wavelength which decreases as the temperature is increased, according to
Wien's displacement law:
T 2.9 oK
For a temperature of 300 0K, the emission peak occurs at about
10 micrometers. If an object is viewed at two separate wavelengths straddling
this peak, temperature variations could be detected by observing the ratio of
the emissions in the two bands.
The accompanying table illustrates the variation in emission observed at
three representative wavelengths for various temperatures. The most notable
effect as temperature increases is that emissions at all wavelengths
increase. To this extent, the increasing intensity from an object as it
approaches an observer is equivalent in effect to increasing temperature.
However, the emission at the short wavelength increases most sharply as a
consequence of the displacement law (as indicated by the column of ratios in
the table), thus making temperature measurements possible.
The objects in fact are not true blackbodies, but have a finite emittance
which is in general a function of wavelength 0 e(X)l. Very importantly,
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Figure 2 - Blackbody Curves (Spectral Radiant Exitance)
for Typical Exoatmospheric RV Temperatures
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Table 1 - Blackbody Brightness for Several Temperatures and Wavelengths
(Spectral Radiant Exitance in watts/(m~ m~1)
Wavel ength(pAn)
T(OK)
8
3.2 x 10 6
6.4 x 106
1.1 x 10
1.9 x 10
2.9 x 10
4.2 x 10
5.8 x 10
7.9 x 10
.12
7.0 x 106
1.0 x 10
1.5 x 10
2.1 x 10
2.8 x 10
3.6 x 10
4.6 x 10
5.6 x 10
16
6.1 x 10 6
8.6 x 106
1.2 x 10
1.5 x 10
1.9 x 10
2.3 x 10
2.7 x 10
3.2 x 107
6.7 x 107 3.7 x 10 7
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
8/1&
0.53
0.74
0.98
1.24
1.52
1.82
2.12
2.45
2.74380 1.0 x 10 8
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the emittance E () has a complementary relationship with the reflectance 0(A),
so that high emittance implies low reflectivity and vice versa.
The intensity of the radiation diminishes with distance according to the
inverse square law. Further, the total power reaching the detector is limited
by the aperture of the observing telescope. For an object of radius 1/2 meter
and temperature 300 0K, viewed at a distance of 1000 km by a telescope with
an aperture of 1/2 meter, the power in a bandwidth of 1 micrometer centered at
10 micrometers is:
P =P () 0 = e \ (T= 300OK) x 10-'
>,= IOgum
= . x 10~ 6 E wc++S
The measurement of such small powers is complicated by thermal noise,
particularly that developed within the detector itsel f. Consequently, the
detectors must be cooled. The mercury-cadmium telluride detectors likely to
used for the two shorter wavelengths must be cooled to about 77 0K (liquid
nitrogen), while the extrinsic silicon detector likely to be necessary for the
longest wavelength must be cooled below 10 0K (approaching the temperature of
liquid helium). In order to be ready for immediate launch and operation, the
detectors must be maintained continuously at these temperatures. In all
likelihood, this can be accomplished by large refrigeration systems on the
ground, with reservoirs of liquid nitrogen and liquid helium carried aboard
the spacecraft for its short flight.
To carry out discrimination, the detectors must be calibrated for
absolute intensity measurements. This poses significant difficulties
particularly for imaging sensors with multiple detectors in an array. Current
fabrication techniques for imaging arrays cannot ensure uniformity of
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performance among the individual detectors; the variations in detector
response are often called "fixed pattern noise". As the image of an object
traverses the array, these variations cause apparent fluctuations in the
detected intensity, thus obscuring the information needed for discrimination.
This error source can be compensated by the data reduction algorithms
supporting the sensor, but only if the system is painstakingly calibrated.
Unfortunately, such calibrations are easily disrupted by external influences,
most importantly, by nuclear radiation.
In addition to generating its own thermal radiation, an object which is
not a true blackbody tends to reflect radiation from other sources, because,
as noted, emittance and absorptance are complementary. Most important of the
reflection sources is the earth, which also has an effective temperature of
about 300 0K and which fills almost-half the sky. The sun is another
important source, but because of its distance it contributes relatively little
intensity in the far infrared. Rather, the sun's much stronger intensity at
shorter wavelengths tends to be absorbed by an object and re-radiated at
longer wavelengths.
The combination of long wavelength, limited telescope aperture, and long
observing distance means that an individual object the size of an RV will
almost certainly be unresolved by the defense's optical system. That is,
diffraction will make all the radiation from the object appear to come from a
single point source. For example, if an RV has an effective diameter of one
meter, and the probe has a telescope aperture of 1/2 meter operating at
10 micrometers, the RV is unresolved at ranges beyond about 50 kilometers.
The situation naturally becomes worse at longer wavelengths. It is unlikely
that the probes will ever be this close to any of the RVs. If the interceptor
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carries a telescope, it is likely to be smaller, perhaps with an aperture of
about 0.1 meter, reducing the range for resolution to about 10 kilometers.
Since the RV and the interceptor are approaching each other at almost
10 km/sec, this would allow the interceptor about one second after resolving
an RV to complete its mission, that is, to observe the object, decide that is
an RV, and maneuver to intercept it. Since this is clearly impractical, the
defense must base its discrimination on observations of unresolved objects.
The offense thus has the opportunity to combine several indistinguishable
sources of radiation on the surface of the attacking objects (RVs and decoys)
in order to confuse the defense. Put another way, the offense has many
degrees of freedom which can be adjusted independently to construct a
specified net emission for three observed wavebands.
Another consequence of the poor resolution of the infrared optical
telescopes is that the attacking objects can hardly be seen at all against the
earth background. At a range of 1000 kilometers, the probe's telescope could
resolve an area about 20 meters across. An RV about a meter across would take
up only a small fraction of this area. If the .RV is projected against an
earth's background at a similar effective temperature, detection, let alone
discrimination, becomes virtually impossible.
While the defense is attempting to separate the RVs from the decoys, the
offense attempts to confuse the two. Passive infrared discrimination is based
on the assumption that the surface emissions of an object betray its contents,
a statement which implicitly suggests the techniques available to the offense
to foil infrared discrimination:
1) insulation;
2) passive surface equilibrium;
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3) surface heating;
4) reflection;
5) noise.
Insulation enables the offense to isolate the surface of an object from
its interior. Although there may be other ways to do this, the most elegant
insulation so far proposed is the Garwin thermos, suggested by Richard Garwin,
a familiar and pungent commentator on BMD systems and policy. Garwin's idea
is that both RVs and decoys could be enveloped by balloons made of aluminized
mylar. These would be inflated shortly after the objects were deployed above
the atmosphere. The aluminum coatings on the balloon and the object would
inhibit radiation exchange between the two, while the vacuum of space would
conveniently suppress thermal conduction.
Having insulated the surfaces of the object from its interior, the
offense can design each surface to be near radiational equilibrium with its
environment. Surfaces are always exchanging radiation with other surfaces
around them; in the present case the attacking objects are exchanging
radiation with the earth and the sun, and with the relatively cold background
of outer space. The rates of emission and absorption depend on the
environment and on the emittance of the surface (which is equal to the
absorptance at any given wavelength). If emission exceeds absorption, the
object tends to cool until the two balance; similarly, if absorption exceeds
emission, the object warms until equilibrium is reached. By adjusting
emittance and absorptance, the object can be designed to maintain a specified
equilibrium temperature in a given environment. The offense could design both
the RVs and the decoys to be in equilibrium at similar temperatures
corresponding to the effective temperature of the earth. This choice would
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minimize the thermal transient which occurs when these objects are launched,
and also camouflage the objects whenever they are viewed against an earth
background.
Techniques for maintaining thermal equilibrium in space are not at all
new; in fact, they are as old as the space age itself. The need to maintain
thermal stability in satellites or in deep space probes has engendered a
sophisticated technology for thermal maintenance. 12 A standard technique is
to use patterns of special paints. Various paints have different specified
emissivities at different wavelengths. The paint patterns chosen would absorb
solar radiation and emit 3000K blackbody radiation at predetermined rates,
allowing predictable passive control of temperatures without a significant
weight penalty. An established elaboration of this technique is to adjust the
effective emittance in flight using louvres and a straightforward thermostatic
system.
Simple electric heaters (or even catalytic burners of oxygen and
hydrogen) could be used to maintain sections of the object's surface at
preselected temperatures. The power requirements for such devices need not be
large. Even if the object were a true blackbody radiating into empty space,
less than 500 watts of power would be required to maintain its temperature.
Much less power would be required if the surface of the object were designed
to be almost in equilibrium with its near-earth surroundings at the specified
temperature. Since it is easier to heat the surface than to cool it, the
designer would aim for an equilibrium temperature slightly lower than the
specified temperature and then use the heater to raise the temperature as
necessary. Because the insulated surface would have low thermal mass, it
could respond very rapidly to controlled adjustments of temperature.
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As noted earlier, emittance and reflectance are complementary to each
other. By making the object's surfaces reflective, the offense disguises the
object's contents while it camouflages the object with the radiation of its
surroundings. The earth of course is the principal source of camouflaging
radiation, since it fills almost half the sky.
Finally, the offense may attempt to confuse the defense's sensors by
dispensing other small radiation sources around the attacking objects. These
are called "aerosol" and are somewhat analogous to the aluminum chaff used to
confuse radar. Since the attacking objects are so poorly resolved by the
defense's optics, the offense could easily surround the objects with a variety
of radiation noisemakers which through both emission and reflection would fill
the discriminating detector with extraneous confusing signals. Further, if
discrimination depended on variations of infrared radiation as a function of
time, the aerosol objects could be made asymmetric and allowed to tumble in
their trajectories, providing a time-varying random noise source. One might
guess that these objects would be somewhat like ping-pong balls, hollow and
light-weight. Possibly the offense would use much finer aerosol, comparable
in size to the infrared wavelengths used by the detectors in order to scatter
light most effectively. However, the only effective source of light for
scattering is the earth; sunlight is not very intense at these wavelengths.
Further, true scattering contributes a degree of polarization to the scattered
light which might aid the defense in suppressing its effects. A more
efficient technique would be to dispense aerosol objects which absorb sunlight
at visual wavelengths and then re-emit the energy thermally at the necessary
long wavelengths.
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All of these techniques can be combined to produce a specified output in
each of the three wavebands for either an RV or a decoy. Because the
defense's optical instruments are unable to resolve an attacking object, the
offense can design the object so that the radiation from several separate
sections of its surface combine to produce an appropriate level of radiation
in each of the three discrimination wavebands. This ability to adjust the
radiation from each section independently, as long as the total radiation
meets specifications, gives the offense extra latitude in designing
anti-discrimination techniques.
A diagrammatic representation of this combination is shown in the
figure. The interior of the object, which may itself contain several regions
at different temperatures, communicates with each external surface through an
insulating layer. Each surface is characterized by its emittance and
complementary reflectance in each of the three wavebands. The temperature at
each surface can be sensed and adjusted as necessary to satisfy thermal
emission requirements. The sun provides some reflected radiation, but
contributes to thermal equilibrium mostly through absorption at shorter
wavelengths. The earth at an effective temperature comparable to the surface
(at each waveband) provides radiation which is both reflected and absorbed. A
microprocessor controller (with sensors to detect external conditions) can
quickly adjust the radiation emitted by the object as a whole.
5) Tracking and Discrimination Combined: The Forward Acquisition System.
Because the time available to conduct the defense is so small, tracking and
probably discrimination must be performed by a system component separate from
the interceptors, generically called the forward acquisition system. In the
A A
Figure 3 - Thermal Emission Control for RVs and Decoys
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scenario described earlier, this task was accomplished by the probes in
ballistic trajectories. Alternatively, these functions might be performed
from a high altitude aircraft flying in northern latitudes, or from satellites.
On present evidence, lofted optical probes appear to be the most likely
candidate for the forward acquisition role. Launched in response to an early
warning message, they carry out an assessment of the attack before the
interceptors are launched. They perform most of the tracking required by the
system and at least some of the discrimination between RVs and decoys.
Observations of most of the attack complex from a high altitude limits the
offense's chances to nullify preferential defense, while extrapolation of the
attack trajectories both forward for impact point prediction and backward for
reconstructing MIRV bus deployments further constrains the offense's tactics.
The optical sensor technology for the probe has already been tested
partially. Four flights of an experiment called the Designating Optical
Tracker13 (Boeing and Hughes) have been launched from Kwajalein Atoll to
view Minuteman RVs launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. A similar sensing
system, the Homing Overlay Experiment (Lockheed) has begun flight testing.
Official descriptions of the exo system suggest that the probe is
launched almost vertically into a trajectory which keeps it aloft for about
20 minutes. Such a trajectory would have a maximum altitude of about 2000 km,
and would require an effective launch velocity of about 5.5 km/sec.
A critical requirement for the probe is that it be able to observe the
attacking objects clearly against the cold background of the sky. Seen
against an earth background, the objects are much more difficult to detect
because they are likely to have temperatures and therefore brightnesses
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comparable to the earth's background. Tracking would then be difficult and
meaningful discrimination impossible.
If the probes observe the attacking objects from an altitude greater than
the objects themselves, then as the objects approach they will at some time
dip below the limb of the earth and therefore be observed against the earth's
background. There is thus a minimum distance for successful observation of
the objects by the probes. This distance is dependent on the altitudes of the
objects and probes, and is likely to be greater than 1000 km. This minimum
range is dictated by two considerations: first, the probe spends most of its
20 minutes aloft at altitudes greater than 1000 km, well above the incoming
RVs, and second, if the probe is launched within a few minutes of the arrival
of the attacking objects, it will still be ascending as the objects are
approaching and descending.
In one respect, a minimum range of 1000 km is not a disadvantage. At
this range the objects are only about 150 seconds from their impact points,
leaving just enough time for the interceptors to be launched for intercepts
above the atmosphere. This consideration would be voided if the probe could
continue its observations and transmit data to the interceptor after the
interceptor is launched towards the RVs.
The offense can exacerbate the minimum distance problem for the defense
14by using depressed trajectories for its RVs. Usually, the offense would
choose to fire each missile payload so that the RVs follow trajectories which
minimize the kinetic energy required for ballistic flight from the launch
point to the targets. However, by sacrificing a fraction of the payload, the
offense can employ non-optimum trajectories which are considerably closer to
the earth's surface. The geometry of the situation is such that only a small
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depression of the trajectory will result in a large increase in the minimum
range for observation. ICBM boosters are usually designed with a significant
margin of boost capacity which for most missions must be wasted, in some
sense. It is therefore likely that depressed trajectories could be
accommodated with relatively little loss of payload capacity. Nevertheless,
depressed trajectories have other drawbacks, including a tendency to decrease
the accuracy of the RVs due to increased errors during re-entry. It is
possible that the offense would choose low trajectories for RVs in an early
attack wave, hoping that these RVs might penetrate to suppress the defense
before the renaining RVs arrive to destroy the ICBM silos.
As noted earlier, the infrared optical telescope is likely to have an
aperture of about 1/2 meter diameter, which at a wavelength of 10 micrometers
gives the telescope a diffraction-limited resolution of about 20 microradians
(20 meters at 1000 kilometers). In effect, this resolution limit determines
the smallest practical unit of angle which can be measured by the optical
system. If each optical resolution element corresponds to one pixel (or
separate picture element) in the solid-state focal plane array, an effective
focal length of 5 meters (obtained using folded reflective optics) provides a
practical pixel spacing of 100 micrometers.
The angular domain which the probe must patrol is huge when measured in
terms of the number of pixels required. The attacking RVs can approach the US
from a 400 range of azimuths and may be viewed over a vertical range of at
least 100 above the earth's limb. At 20 microradians/pixel , this is an
angular domain of 35,000 x 9000 pixels. Of course, if the probe continues to
observe the RVs as they approach and pass abreast, an even larger observing
domain will be required.
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Because such a large domain cannot be observed continuously, the
telescope must scan its patrol domain. It is possible to design telescopes
with a rectangular field of view as large as 100 in one dimension, so it
might not be necessary to scan in the vertical dimension. This of course
implies a focal plane array about 9000 pixels high (almost a meter), a goal
which may not be achievable. To increase the total observing time, the
scanning array might be 10-100 pixels wide. As the image of an object is
scanned from one column of pixels to the next, electronic logic would transfer
the accumulated signal in step with it. Even with the advantage of this time
delay and integration (TDI), the total amount of time that any one object
could be viewed is small. For example, if the scanning array is as large as
100 pixels wide and must scan over 35,000 pixels, each object can be viewed
only 1/350th of the time. If the probe can view an object over an interval of
4 minutes, each object is effectively observed for only about 1/2 second. If
the probe completes a scan every 20 seconds, there is thus time for 12 scans
of about 0.05 seconds each.
An alternative to launching the probes vertically is to launch them on
northward ballistic trajectories into the path of the attacking objects.
While these trajectories allow the probe to come arbitrarily close to the
objects and to view them against the sky, they have several potential
disadvantages. First, a close approach may make the probe more vulnerable to
offensive countermeasures. Second, by increasing the closing speed between
probes and RVs, it somewhat shortens the interval during which observations
can be made, from about 4-1/2 minutes to about 2-1/2 minutes. Third, from a
lower altitude an individual probe will be able to observe a smaller fraction
of the overall attack, thus tempting the offense to expand its options for
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overcoming preferential defense. Fourth, the sensor may require a wider field
of view to track the attacking targets as they approach the probe.
Nevertheless, by launching several probes into different trajectories, none
too close to the attackers, it should be possible to overcome all these
objections.
Rather than launch the probes in response to an attack, another
possibility is to maintain them in orbit constantly. A probe in low orbit
could view the attack from a fixed altitude much lower than that of the lofted
probe, thus making it easier to view the attack against a sky background.
However, such a deployment would suffer the same disadvantages that
plague all strategic systems based on satellites in low orbit.15 In order
to ensure that several probes were in position over the US at the moment they
were needed to view an attack, several hundred probes must be maintained in
orbit with the expectation that most of them would be out of position in other
parts of their orbits at the critical moment. Since the probes are
sophisticated and expensive components of exo defense, the cost of maintaining
this large fleet may be prohibitive. Further, having the probes in orbit
leaves them vulnerable to possible Soviet attacks which of course could be
timed to embarrass the defense at a critical moment.
Maintaining the probes in orbit involves at least one special technical
problem. The IR sensors aboard the probe must be maintained at very low
temperatures in order to avoid overwhelming them with their own thermal
noise. If the probes are ground-based, the sensors can be maintained at these
low temperatures (about 10*0K) by external refrigeration equipment. For the
short period after launch when the sensors are in operation, they can be
cooled (to about 4'K) by a small portable reservoir of liquid helium.
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However, state-of-the-art refrigeration systems which can maintain 10 0K are
quite heavy. They require mechanical compressors with special problems of
lubrication. With present technology, it is difficult to imagine such a
refrigeration system operating for years without maintainance, as would be
required for a satellite. Portable refrigeration systems capable of liquid
helium temperatures are far more problematical. However, long-term cryogenic
cooling is a requirement shared by many civilian and military programs.
Recent reports suggest that new techniques may become available during the
next decade to satisfy this requirement. 1 6
In yet another alternative, forward acquisition might be carried out from
high-altitude aircraft instead of space vehicles. In this case, the sensors
would be above most but not all of the atmosphere, which would be a source of
absorption and noise. Further, aircraft would probably have to be maintained
continuously on station because there would be too little time available after
an alert for an aircraft to take off and reach operating altitude. The cost
of maintaining aircraft continuously aloft might be prohibitive even if
aircraft could perform the forward acquisition role acceptably.
While the optical probe is necessary to carry out tracking, in view of
the foregoing it is very hard to believe that the probe could successfully
perform discrimination. It is obvious that discrimination is the most
demanding problem for exo BMD, and the probe operates over too great a
distance for too short an effective period of time for discrimination against
a sophisticated attack to be credible. The task of discrimination must
therefore be forced onto the interceptor, or even onto the KVs themselves.
The role of the probes in providing timely data for an orderly defense would
then be severely compromised, offering the offense opportunities for
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suppressing the defense. For example, the offense could launch a barrage of
decoys, forcing the defense to commit its interceptors uselessly before the
main attack by real RVs.
If such complications could be circumvented, then there may be some
advantage in reserving the discrimination function for the interceptors. The
probes can be that much simpler and the interceptors can approach much more
closely before committing the system to discrimination decisions. Further,
the inteceptors may even approach close enough to allow active means of
discrimination, such as radar or laser reflection, although what technical
basis would be used for active discrimination is not obvious. However, the
cost is high. Having to reproduce sophisticated sensor and computer hardware
for each interceptor (or KV) clearly adds to the weight of the interceptor
payload and to the overall expense of the exo system.
6) Multiple kill vehicles. Since each ICBM can carry several RVs, it
would require several simple interceptors to defend against one ICBM. Each
interceptor would require a complete booster rocket with all its ancillary
equipment (such as launch facilities and guidance), thus making it expensive
to offset one MIRVed ICBM with multiple interceptors. In fact, MIRVs were
developed originally as a means for saturating ABM systems. To offset the
advantage of MIRVs, it is necessary for each interceptor to kill several RVs.
For a system using non-nuclear kill, this means that each interceptor must
carry several independent kill vehicles, in effect "fighting MIRV with MIRV."
Two separate development programs for kill vehicles have been supported
by the Army BMD program. The first KV, called the HIT (Homing Interceptor
Technology) vehicle was developed by Vought. It is designed to home on its
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target and destroy it by direct impact. The original HIT vehicle was designed
to weigh only 15 pounds and to be very inexpensive. Such KVs might be
deployed freely against both RVs and decoys with little regard for accurate
discrimination. A different version is being developed as the Air Force
anti-satellite weapon, to be launched from an F-15 aircraft. This version has
become much heavier and far more expensive than the original HIT vehicle was
intended to be. A more recent KV, called the HOE (Homing Overlay Experiment)
vehicle has been developed by Lockheed. It is estimated to weigh several
hundred pounds and destroys its target by scattering shrapnel in its path.
The interceptor might deploy its KVs either simultaneously or in
sequence. If each KV can be assigned its target simultaneously by data
transfer before it is deployed, all the KVs may be deployed almost immediately
as soon as the interceptor is clear of the atmosphere. If, on the other hand,
the interceptor must maneuver to acquire each new target and direct the KV
toward it, then the KVs must be deployed sequentially. Sequential deployment
of KVs may impose constraints on the inteceptor's deployment schedule.
In many defensive situations, it is desirable to have some method of
verifying that a successful kill has been made so that the defense system can
be re-directed against other adversaries. Such kill verification criteria
probably will be superfluous for exo BMD. Within the time constraints imposed
on the exo system, there would probably be too little time to deploy a second
exo kill vehicle against an RV after an initial attack even if it was known to
fail.
Some doubt has been expressed that an RV can be reliably destroyed by
collision because the thermonuclear weapons in ballistic missile RVs are said
to be quite robust and difficult to disrupt. On the other hand, because the
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RV decelerates extremely violently during re-entry, the integrity of its heat
shield is crucial to its survival or at least to its accuracy on target. A
collision between the RV and even a small object at closing speeds of
9-10 km/sec should be devastating. Any damage to the RV, even if it were not
detectable before re-entry, would almost certainly cause the RV to break up or
to deviate obviously from its course during re-entry. Survival of the RV
during re-entry is therefore a credible negative criterion for kill. If an
endo system were deployed in support of the exo system, one could reliably
assume the viability of any RV surviving re-entry on target.
The homing accuracy required of these kill vehicles is unprecedented in
BMD applications, so uncertainty must exist about its reliability.
Fortunately, both the HIT and the HOE vehicles will soon be tested in
realistic settings. Prototypes of the HIT vehicle have already been tested in
laboratory conditions. In addition, the Air Force is developing a variant of
the HIT vehicle as an anti-satellite weapon to be launched from an F-15
aircraft. This system may be tested against satellites in the near future.
The HOE vehicle is due to be tested against Minuteman re-entry vehicles over
the Pacific. In short, indicative tests of non-nuclear kill should take place
in the near future.
The booster carrying the kill vehicles must be adequate to loft the KVs
above the atmosphere into the paths of the incoming RVs. The Spartan
interceptor of the Sentinel and Safeguard programs is a suggestive
antecedent. It could reach a height of about 950 km or a ground range of
about 950 km, and it defended a roughly circular area of somewhat smaller
radius. From this evidence one may infer that the Spartan rocket generated
kinetic energy equivalent to about 2.5 km/sec at ground level. If this
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velocity were generated instantaneously at ground level, the Spartan would
require about 45 seconds to climb straight up to an altitude of 100 km. A
Spartan with finite acceleration on an inclined trajectory might require
60-75 seconds from launch until the kill vehicles were deployed. The RVs
would traverse about 420-525 km in this interval, and would still be several
hundred kilometers from their targets. Thus the interceptors must be launched
while the RVs are still about 1000 km from their targets.
With an effective range of less than 950 km, each interceptor site could
defend no more than one of the current Minuteman ICBM bases. Therefore, six
separate sites would be needed to defend the Minuteman force completely, and
additional sites might be needed to defend the MX bases if they were not
collocated with the Minuteman bases.
The booster might be enlarged to achieve greater range and therefore
greater coverage. To take advantage of the improved performance, the
interceptors would have to be launched earlier with the RVs at greater ranges.
7) Computation and battle management. In a large attack, the defensive
system would face perhaps 50,000 objects in ballistic trajectories, including
RVs, decoys, and booster fragments. The computer for the system must be able
to contend with a huge volume of data in real time. Extraneous objects such
as booster debris or spent MIRV buses would have to be suppressed at an early
stage of computation to avoid saturating the computer. Decoys must be
separated from RVs according to sophisticated algorithms. Accurate tracking
data must be computed and interceptor courses calculated.
The actual volume of computation required for BMD applications is
difficult to assess, and is not in itself a critical issue in assessing exo
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BMD. The question arises now because it was important in earlier ABM
debates. The commercial computers available when Sentinel and Safeguard were
designed were inadequate for the requirements of endoatmospheric defense in
particular, in which an entire engagement may take place in an interval of
about ten seconds. Exoatmospheric engagements would take place over periods
of several minutes, and of course computer technology has advanced
considerably over the last decade. More important than the mere volume of
computation is the issue of reliability. Can the computational facilities of
an exo system be distributed, protected, and maintained so that the system is
always ready to manage a huge threat on short notice in spite of the offense's
efforts to disrupt them?
The air traffic control computer network may serve as an example of an
interconnected system demonstrating necessarily stringent reliability, but the
parallel is questionable. Unlike BMD systems, the system has been exercised
in realistic circumstances for years, so that idiosyncrasies have been
identified and eliminated. Further, although computers are indispensible for
normal operation of air traffic control, the system is ultimately under the
supervision of knowledgeable human operators, who typically have time to
recognize and compensate for system lapses if they occur.
There is of course a special requirement for mobile computers to support
the optical sensors on the probe. However, the mobile computer almost
certainly will not perform the role of Battle Manager executing strategy for
the system as a whole. Rather, it is needed to reduce the huge volume of raw
data produced by the sensors before that data is forwarded to the ground to be
digested by the Battle Manager computer. Therefore, the mobile computer must
be sized to achieve an optimal reduction of the flow of data between the probe
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and the ground. Transferring and preprocessing raw data from the optical
sensors allows a high degree of parallelism which simplifies the task. This
data compression role is relatively minor and may well be achievable with
current technology.
Such sophisticated computers have large power requirements. For example,
the Cray 1 or the Cyber 205 need about 100 kilowatts of power for operation of
the central processor alone. Not only would the probe vehicle have to provide
the necessary power over a period of several minutes, it would also have to
dissipate the heat generated. A recirculating refrigeration system would be
heavy, while a once-through cooling system would require a large reservoir of
refrigerant which if discharged overboard would generate a large plume. A
hazard for the probe already acknowledged is the possible contamination of its
19
operating environment by unintended outgassing from the probe itself.
To avoid these problems, BM1D officials hope to use a cryogenic computer
based on superconducting Josephson junctions. Several computer manufacturers
(notably IBM) are intensively pursuing development of superconducting
computers because they offer significant advantages in civilian applications,
especially speed, compactness, and low power requirements. Nevertheless,
progress is slow. Only simple superconducting computer circuits have been
demonstrated to date, and small laboratory prototype computers are not
anticipated before 1985. Large computers intended for mobile operation in
hostile environments will not be available until years later.
8) Communications. Because the components and functions of the system
must be distributed in various locations, reliable communications must be
established among the components. Three generic types of communications may
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be required, each with its own intrinsic vulnerabilities. Ground-to-ground
links such as those for early warning might be physically destroyed.
Space-to-ground links such as those from the probes to the Battle Manager
might be disrupted for extended periods by nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere. Space-to-space links, which may be required for direct
communications among the probes and interceptors, also might be interrupted at
least momentarily by nuclear explosions.
The assurance of reliable communications is essentially a straightforward
engineering problem, to be solved using known techniques.19 The most
significant problem is the preservation of links between the probes and the
Battle Manager through the atmosphere in spite of disruptions by nuclear
detonations. A reduction of the volume of data to be transmitted through the
use of data compression techniques aboard the mobile computer tends to
ameliorate this problem. Nevertheless, the volume of data to be transmitted
will be huge, straining communications even in benign circumstances. While
the general principles of data transmission through a nuclear blackout are
well understood, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty precludes detailed testing of the
transmission link and therefore enforces conservative design.
The most likely mode of communication through the atmosphere will be the
EHF or SHF radio bands (0.1 - 10 cm). At these wavelengths, a small antenna
can provide a narrow beam over a straight path, although the beam must be
accurately steered. The narrow beam maximizes signal strength while it
minimizes opportunities for enemy jamming. A high carrier frequency also
offers higher data rates through larger bandwidths. Finally, the absorption
of radio waves by plasmas induced by nuclear fireballs is less for higher
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frequencies, although the communications system must still be designed to
avoid the effects of scintillation (phase shifts) caused by plasma turbulence.
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IV. Anticipated Countermeasures
If the US chose to deploy an exoatmospheric BMD system, presumably the
USSR would attempt to find ways to overcome it. Because the success of exo
BMD depends so critically on the successful opertion of each of its
components, the offense would obviously attack its weakest links. Offensive
tactics might include:
1) Attacks on vulnerable system components, such as the early warning
system, the probes, the interceptors, or the Battle Manager computer;
2) Pin-down attacks by ICBMs or SLBMs on the probes and interceptors;
3) Spoofing, to draw the defense into committing itself against a phony
attack.
1) Attacks on vulnerable system components. As already noted, the early
warning system must function in a timely fashion to initiate the operation of
the BMD system. Some elements of the system, in particular the early warning
radars, are placed in vulnerable locations which makes them likely targets for
a sudden disruptive attack. As satellites become increasingly important for
early warning, it is likely that they also will be threatened by new weapons.
The USSR has shown considerable interest in anti-satellite weapons and has
tested crude anti-satellite interceptors.
The probes are especially important and especially vulnerable components
of exo BMD. In view of their complexity, it is likely that the system can
include only a small number of probes relative to the number of interceptors.
In order to perform their tasks of tracking and discrimination, the probes
must be launched above the atmosphere toward the stream of attacking objects.
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To disrupt the probes, the offense might replace some of its RVs with
thermonuclear weapons designed to detonate near the probes. Above the
atmosphere, the most important effects of a nuclear explosion would be soft
x-radiation from the nuclear fireball, and neutrons and gamma radiation from
the nuclear reactions. The x-rays can be stopped fairly easily by metallic
shielding if it has sufficient heat capacity to withstand the energy
absorbed. The gamma radiation may also be partly shielded, and its effects on
the probe components may be less significant than those of the neutrons. High
energy neutrons present the greatest threat because it is difficult to shield
against them and because they are highly disruptive to solid state
electronics. For this reason, a weapon to be used against the probes would be
designed (much like the so-called neutron bomb) to produce a large yield of
high energy neutrons from thermonuclear reactions.
Techniques for hardening electronics against nuclear radiation will of
course be incorporated in the design of the probe to reduce its vulnerability,
although they will increase its weight and complexity. The new technologies
which may be included in the probe, such as solid state infrared detector
arrays and cryogenic computers, may pose new problems for radiation
hardening. The properties of the crystalline materials used in the detectors
must be carefully optimized to achieve useful efficiency at such low photon
energies, making them especially vulnerable to radiation. Even minor
disruption of the detectors might disastrously alter their sensitivities,
making it impossible for the probe to perform accurate discrimination.
An important mechanism for reducing the effects of nuclear radiation in
solid-state electronics is the thermal annealing of the crystalline defects
generated by radiation. This mechanism is highly temperature-dependent.
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While it may be effective at ordinary temperatures, it will not be effective
at the cryogenic temperatures in which the detectors and perhaps the mobile
computer must operate.
It is difficult to assess quantitatively how completely the probe must be
hardened, or how close a nuclear weapon must be detonated to disable it. Some
impression may be gained from the example of a 1 MT exoatmospheric explosion.
At a distance of 10 km, such an explosion would deliver roughly 80 cal/cm2
in x-rays, 104 rads(Si) of gamma radiation, and 2 x 1013
2 20
neutrons/cm . To survive these levels, strenuous hardening efforts
would be required.
Rather than attempt to destroy the probe directly, the offense may choose
to detonate warheads in the probe's field of view. Although the vulnerable
detector arrays would be shielded from most of the radiation by baffling which
takes advantage of the folded optical system, some of the infrared radiation
in the passbands of the optical system will reach the detectors and may blind
at least parts of the arrays.
It is even conceivable that the offense could place high energy lasers
aboard the MIRV buses to incapacitate the probes as they approach the
attacking objects. High energy carbon dioxide lasers are relatively compact
and efficient, and their emission lies in the infrared where it might succeed
in blinding the probe's sensors.
More importantly, the radiation from such detonations would excite large
regions of the upper atmosphere, causing it to fluoresce for a considerable
period. If this light is outside the field of view of the probe, careful
optical design can prevent it from reaching the detector arrays. However,
fluorescence in the field of view may mask the probe's view of the attacking
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objects. Sophisticated image processing algorithms can be expected to
compensate partially for fluorescence which appears in the same picture
elements as an attacking object, but the correction is likely to be
imperfect. As always, the discrimination function is most sensitive to this
additional disruption.
Fluorescence as a result of nuclear explosions is strongly dependent on
altitude, and may not be a severe problem in viewing the attacking objects
when they are far above the earth's limb. However, by carefully placing its
nuclear precursors in the upper atmosphere behind the attacking objects along
the probe's line of sight, the offense can raise the altitude at which the
objects are masked by the earth's limb and therefore increase the minimum
distance at which the probes can view the objects for tracking and
discrimination.
The offense may also detonate nuclear precursors in the paths of the
ascending interceptors and kill vehicles. Presumably, the precursor warheads
would lead the attack wave, forcing the interceptors to pass through them to
attack the RVs. Such a precursor attack would have to be carefully planned,
because the precursor explosions would threaten the offensive objects as well
as the defensive vehicles. In particular, the lightweight decoys would be
especially vulnerable to such explosions, so the offense would have to be sure
not to ease the task of discrimination for the defense. However, the sensing
and guidance systems of the interceptors and kill vehicles are complex and
intrinsically more vulnerable than the simple detonators carried by the RVs.
The Battle Manager is an ill-defined concept in current exo scenarios.
Nevertheless, the exo system must include a component which collates all the
incoming sensor data and co-ordinates the system's response. Naturally, the
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Battle Manager could become a critical bottleneck for the system and a
tempting target for the offense. To minimize the risk to the system, the
Battle Manager function may be distributed among several large computers,
separately located and perhaps mobile, any one of which could assume all of
the Battle Manager tasks should the others be lost. Nevertheless, the
preservation of the Battle Manager and its links with the rest of the system
will be difficult under the stress of a determined attack.
2) Pin-down attacks. Based in underground silos, the probes and
interceptors would be relatively safe from anything other than a direct hit by
a nuclear weapon. However, if the system is to succeed in defending against a
structured attack, it must be able to launch the probes and interceptors
within a very short period. For the probes, this period might be as long as
20 minutes, from the time the Soviet ICBMs are launched until they re-enter
the atmosphere. This may be shortened by the interval required for the early
warning system to detect the ICBM launches and communicate a warning. For the
interceptors, the launch period is much shorter. If the RVs are allowed to
close within 1000 km of their targets, then the interceptors will have just
enough time to ascend above the atmosphere before the RVs re-enter; there
would be hardly any margin for delay. If the interceptors could be launched
any time after the RVs had closed within 2000 km, then a window of
approximately 2 minutes would be available for launch.
By exploding nuclear warheads near the launch sites of the probes and
interceptors, the offense might be able to prevent their launch or destroy
them after they are launched. The heavy debris excavated by a ground burst
would remain aloft many seconds after the explosion, posing a hazard to an
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ascending interceptor. If weapons explode while the interceptor is ascending,
it may be destroyed by nuclear effects. Although it might be difficult for
the offense to place such warheads on target with ICBMs, due to the presence
of the defense system itself, SLBMs might be able to penetrate below the
defense system with very little warning.
3) Spoofing. Because timing is critical to the operation of exo BMD,
the offense may attempt to disrupt the system's timing by spoofing the
system's sensors. The goal of spoofing is to draw the defense into committing
itself against a false threat so that it is unavailable to counter a later
real threat. For example, the offense may launch a swarm of decoys rather
than real RVs toward the US ICBM silos. Since the early warning system could
not distinguish between decoys and RVs, the defense would be obliged to launch
its probes to assess the threat. The offense would thus draw the defense
without having to expend real warheads of its own. Naturally, the defense
would retain reserve probes in anticipation of spoofing, but the offense could
stage this tactic repeatedly. Providing enough probes to keep the system
viable in the face of such tactics would sharply increase the complexity and
cost of the system without adding to its value.
Spoofing becomes even more serious if the interceptors and not the probes
perform the discrimination function. In this case the defense must launch its
interceptors before discovering the attack is a hoax. Then the offense has a
variety of options for overcoming the defense, as suggested by the following
scenario. The offense could launch its attack in two waves, the first wave
consisting almost entirely of decoys to imitate a massive attack. (An ICBM
which might otherwise carry 10 real RVs could carry over 100 decoys instead.)
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The defense might guess that this first wave was essentially a spoof, but
would be obliged to assume that the offense had included at least one real RY
per target. Without knowing how many real RVs the swarm contained, the
defense must launch enough real interceptors to deal with the entire swarm.
Only after the interceptors had reached altitude and uncovered their sensors
could they discover that they had been spoofed. The second wave, consisting
of many real RVs, would follow a minute or two behind the first wave, just out
of range of the first wave of interceptors. Unless a fresh salvo of
interceptors were available for launch, these real RVs would penetrate
unimpeded to their targets. The defense might attempt to thwart this tactic
by launching its ICBMs as soon as the attack was confirmed to be real (that
is, as the few surviving RVs from the first wave exploded over their
targets). However, coordinating these launches so that they occurred during
the very short interval between the first and second attack waves would
obviously be quite risky, especially with the uproar of the exploding first
wave close at hand. The offense could make the problem even more awkward by
exploding warheads from the second wave in the paths of the ascending
missiles. Even with the most favorable outcome, the entire BMD system would
have bought the defense a delay of about two minutes.
Such a scenario is by itself too simple to be taken very literally, but
it could easily be made more complicated. The offense must gamble on the
optimum number of RVs per target to send in the first wave. To conserve its
assets, the defense must gamble on the offense's gamble. Perhaps the ICBMs
could escape under fire between the two attack waves, or perhaps they would
fail catastrophically. Both the offense and the defense must take enormous
risks in these circumstances. The defense system may merely complicate these
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risks without actually reducing them. It is hardly the straightforward
solution to ICBM vulnerability it may at first appear.
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V. Performance Requirements
Since no definitive design of the exo system can be developed in the near
future, it would be risky to speculate about the performance an exo system
might actually achieve. On the other hand, it is possible to make some basic
estimates of the performance the system would have to achieve in order to be
attractive for specific strategic missions such as ICBM defense. Even very
simple models can highlight important requirements for exo defense.
Soviet ICBMs carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles
(MIRVs) pose the most obvious threat to the survivability of US ICBMs.
Because ICBMs carry multiple warheads, a small number of Soviet ICBMs could in
principle be launched to aim a large number of warheads at US ICBMs.
In fact, because the destruction of one US ICBM would eliminate several
threatening warheads, the Soviets might be willing to aim several warheads at
each ICBM silo. This places an enormous burden on a ballistic missile defense
system. In order to preserve any one ICBM site from an attack by several RVs,
the BMD system must destroy every (reliable) RV attacking it. Even if the
probability of destroying an RV is relatively high, the probability of
destroying all the RVs is significantly less. For example, assume that the
BMD system can achieve a probability of 0.8 for destroying an RV; that is, the
system can destroy 80% of the RVs it attempts to destroy. Such a success rate
is exceptional for any military system, and is all the more remarkable given
the special technical requirements of exo BMD. Yet if the Soviets aim eight
(reliable) RVs at each target (a large but not unimaginable number), the
probability for the survival of the target even if the defense attacks all
eight is (0.8)8 = 0.17, a potentially catastrophic dilution of performance.
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This observation can be generalized. If the offense's sole objective is
to destroy a specific target, it can in principle attack the target repeatedly
in order to reduce the probability of the target's survival to any desired
level, unless the defense is perfect. Only a small number of attacks is
sufficient to reduce a high probability of successfully intercepting attackers
to a low probability of surviving attacks. In fact, should they desire to
destroy the US ICBM force, the Soviets already have enough RVs to attack each
fixed missile site several times, and they can add many more RVs before a new
defense system is deployed.
More complicated models of ballistic missile defense can be constructed
to include many of the features already described for exo defense, such as
preferential defense and decoys. While these add many parameters to the
calculations, they do not fundamentally alter the observation that the defense
will be at a serious disadvantage if the offense attacks each target with
several warheads.
Such a model has already been discussed by Ashton Carter in his review of
BMD for the OTA report on MX missile basing. 2 1 Carter's model did not
include decoys but did include preferential defense and the support of a
fairly effective endo defense system. An extension of the OTA model has been
developed (see the Appendix) which explicitly incorporates preferential
defense and includes decoys and discrimination. Results from the extended
model confirm Carter's earlier conclusion that an exo system must achieve a
very high level of performance to defeat a massive attack such as the Soviets
could mount against the 1000 Minutemen silos by 1990.
The OTA model assumed that the Soviets would be able to aim 8 reliable
RVs at each individual Minuteman silo, for a total of 8000 RVs. The USSR
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already has about 6000 RVs deployed on ICBMs, although of course at least some
of these RVs would be reserved for targets other than ICBMs. Presented with
the problem of overcoming a ballistic missile defense, the USSR might choose
to enlarge this number considerably. It would therefore be imprudent to
assume that the USSR would not be willing to aim 8000 RVs at US ICBMs. The
additional deployment of 200 MX missiles at fixed sites would hardly alter
this situation, except that the MX missiles might draw an even heavier attack
because they each carry 10 RVs while the Minuteman III missiles carry 3.
The OTA model also assumed that the system would be supported by an
endoatmospheric system (such as LoADS) which could intercept leakers. The
assumed endo system could destroy the first leaker over each silo with a
probability of 0.7, and could destroy a second leaker with a probability of
0.5. Three or more leakers would overwhelm the endo system and destroy the
target.
These assumptions may be overly optimistic for the defense, in part
because they place severe demands on the performance of the endo system. The
original LoADS system was designed to defend each target only once. Possibly
extra interceptors could be added if the burden of extra intercepts is not too
great for the radar and the computer, and if the nuclear environment does not
become too severe. Moreover, the mission of LoADS in an MPS role was
different from the role it would play in supporting an exo system. While
LoADS was required to achieve an intercept probability of only 0.5 or better
in order to achieve an important strategic goal, an endo system in support of
the exo system must achieve the best performance possible.
The exo system itself was characterized in the OTA model by the
probability P0 that the system would destroy a given RV. By varying this
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parameter, the OTA model showed that the success of an exo defense, even
without the threat of decoys, depended critically on the system's performance
as expressed by P0 .
The extended model described in the Appendix includes decoys. In the
particular example presented here, it is assumed that the offense deploys five
decoys with each real RV. Realistically, the defense cannot discriminate
against these decoys absolutely; some decoys will attract KVs and some RVs
will escape notice to leak through the exo system. Decoys and RVs are assumed
to present to the defense two gaussian probability distributions whose means
are separated by, for example, two standard deviations. This separation
capability is sometimes expressed in BMD literature in terms of the
K parameter. Roughly speaking, a value of K = 2 implies that the average
difference which can be discerned between the measurements of RVs and decoys
is about twice the typical error made in the measurements. The defense must
then decide what fraction of the RVs, and implicitly what fraction of the
decoys, it must designate for interception in order to achieve a successful
defense. The defense may choose to defend a small number of targets
vigorously. To accomplish this, a large fraction of the RVs must be
destroyed, and therefore a large number of KVs must be wasted on decoys.
Alternatively, the defense may choose to defend a larger number of silos less
vigorously, so that (in the mean) the same number of silos survives. In this
case, the defense will be somewhat more willing to tolerate leakers;
consequently, a smaller fraction of the decoys aimed at defended targets will
be destroyed. However, KVs will still be wasted defending silos which will
ultimately be destroyed by leakers. The analysis in the Appendix shows that
there is an optimum choice for defense strategy which minimizes the number of
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kill vehicles required to preserve a specified number of silos in the face of
a specified attack. Typically in the present example, the defense must
designate about 85% of the RVs for interception while wasting KVs on about 20%
of the decoys. However, because there are five times as many decoys as RVs,
more KVs are designated to attack decoys than to attack real RVs.
Each KV launched is assumed to destroy its designated target with a
probability PK of 0.9. Here again, the reliability assigned is open to
debate. Among other things, reliability depends partly on readiness or
availability. Individual missiles can be made to achieve an availability of
0.9 only with great difficulty in practice. However, in an actual engagement,
the defense may be able to choose among several available KVs for each
designated RV, so the issue of KV availability may not be a problem. Still,
in performing a non-nuclear kill, the KV must achieve a remarkable technical
feat with remarkable reliability. The defense may choose to designate two or
more KVs per object to improve its effective reliability, but this of course
multiplies the total number of KVs required.
The model also assumes that the defense exercises preferential defense,
concentrating all of its resources to defend a specified fraction of the total
number of silos. For the present example, the defense attempts to preserve
200 Minuteman silos out of the original 1000. In view of the realistic
possibility of leakage, more than 200 silos must be defended to achieve this
goal. If the defense can predict both the leakage rate and the number of KVs
required to defend each silo, then the number of silos which must be defended
as well as the total number of KVs required for defense can be calculated.
Some results from this particular example are shown in Table 2. Three
different cases of discrimination capability (that is, values of the
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Table 2 - Performance of BMD Layered System in the Presence of Exo Decoys
Exo kill probability: PK 0.9
Endo kill probabilities: P1 = 0.7; P2 = 0.5
(RVs/Target) N = 8
(Decoys/RV) D = 5
x PR S R T
K = 1.5 1.4 0.9193 0.5697 45.2 9040
1.35 0.9115 0.5531 45.0 9000
1.3 0.9032 0.5354 44.9 8980
1.25 0.8944 0.5168 44.9 8980
1.2 0.8849 0.4973 45.0 9000
1.15 0.8749 0.4768 45.1 9020
K = 2.0 1.3 0.9032 0.5354 31.6 6320
1.25 0.8944 0.5168 31.4 6280
1.2 0.8849 0.4973 31.3 6260
1.15 0.8749 0.4768 31.3 6260
1.1 0.8643 0.4556 31.3 6260
1.05 0.8531 0.4336 31.5 6300
1.0 0.8414 0.4110 31.8 6360
K = 2.5 1.3 0.9032 0.5354 22.1 4420
1.25 0.8944 0.5168 22.0 4400
1.2 0.8849 0.4973 22.0 4400
1.15 0.8749 0.4768 22.1 4420
1.1 0.8643 0.4556 22.3 4460
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discrimination parameter K) are shown. The variable x is in effect a measure
of the vigor with which the targets are defended, and NT is the number of
kill vehicles required to preserve 200 Minuteman silos in the specified
circumstances.
BMD performance is often characterized by cost-exchange ratios, but the
present example illustrates that it is difficult to construct a specific
definition for this concept. For example, consider an optimum defense when
the discrimination parameter K = 2. For this case, the USSR has expended
8000 RVs (and 40,000 decoys) to destroy about 800 US ICBMs (corresponding to
2400 RVs if the US ICBMs happen to be Minuteman IIIs). The US has expended
6260 KVs while defending 420 ICBMs and preserving about 200. Even if the BMD
system operates as expected, several thousand enemy warheads have been
detonated over the US, along with several hundred smaller endo defense nuclear
warheads. Among the many ratios which may be constructed from these numbers,
which one accurately describes the utility of the BMD system?
While more detailed conclusions from the model are discu.ssed in the
Appendix, several observations stand out from this example:
1) When the offense aims many RVs at each individual target, the
performance of the exo defense must be quite good in order to salvage a
strategically significant fraction of the ICBM force. Unexpected small
slippages in performance could have disastrous effects.
2) The exo defense requires a capable endo defense to support it in this
example as in most realistic cases.
3) For optimal performance, the defense must decide how many silos to
defend preferentially; this in turn requires a realistic prediction of system
performance in advance.
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4) The number of KVs required is most sensitive to the discrimination
parameter K, which in view of the difficulties involved in infrared
discrimination is the parameter most difficult to predict with confidence.
The caution should be added that these numbers are all only statistical
averages obtained from a statistical model. If a BMD engagement is properly
represented by one sample of a random process, the numbers arising from an
actual engagement are likely to be different from those presented here, simply
as a consequence of "luck", even within the limitations of the model. (In
fact, the average deviations from these averages could be calculated from the
model .) When all of the real complications of conducting a nuclear war are
considered, the deviations to be anticipated become even larger. It is hard
to imagine either side drawing any confidence from such analyses.'
While they may not be numerically accurate, such examples illustrate that
BMD in isolation solves the wrong problem. The real problem is that a
relatively small number of fixed and identifiable targets (US ICBM sites) can
be attacked by a large number of warheads (which could be carried by ICBMs or
perhaps by other vehicles). If the number of targets (approximately
1000-1200 ICBM sites) can be multiplied by a significant factor (at least 4) -
through deceptive basing, for example - then a realizable BMD might prove to
be an effective additional deterrent. The obvious difficulty is that an
expensive defense must be added to an expensive basing scheme for an expensive
strategic weapon in order to restore (possibly) the survivability of ICBMs.
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VI. Strategic Utility
The exoatmospheric missile defense system currently envisioned is
applicable to a very specific scenario. It is assumed that at the beginning
of a nuclear war, when all strategic systems are still intact, the Soviets
would attack US ICBMs with their own ICBMs. A deployed BMD system might then
insure that the US ICBM force could survive such an attack and remain
available for retaliation. The analysis of the previous section makes it
questionable whether a BMD system could in fact parry a determined Soviet
attack on US ICBMs. Nevertheless, the BMD system must also be examined in the
context of other possible scenarios.
Another role sometimes suggested for exo BMD is as a defense against
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The exo system is not likely to
be effective in this role. In contrast to ICBMs, which would be fired at long
range from known launch sites, SLBMs could be launched over much shorter
ranges from-a variety of azimuths. The uncertainty of the launch azimuth
further increases the amount of sky the BMD system must patrol. Worse, the
SLBMs would follow lower trajectories for a shorter period of time, making
them that much more difficult to track successfully.
Fortunately, contemporary submarine-launched missiles are not a threat to
land-based hard targets because inevitable uncertainties in the position and
velocity of the launch point make submarine-launched missiles relatively
inaccurate. Nevertheless, the US is already proposing (for the Trident II D-5
program) to provide, through improved guidance, hard target kill capability
for submarine-launched missiles by 1990. If they wanted to do so, the Soviets
may be able to emulate this performance shortly thereafter.
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It is sometimes suggested that advances in US anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) capabilities may eventually confine Soviet submarines to protected home
waters. While this outcome may be desirable, it is by no means a reliable
projection at present.
It is appropriate to remember also that in addition to ballistic missiles
there are other strategic systems such as bombers or cruise missiles for which
exo BMD is totally irrelevant. In the absence of other defense systems
effective against these threats, even a perfect area defense against ballistic
missiles is virtually meaningless.
The BMD scenario implies that it would not be acceptable to launch US
ICBMs under attack. In some cases, this presumption would be justified.
Clearly, if an apparent attack by Soviet ICBMs on US ICBMs were the first
indication of a nuclear war, it would be desirable to have an alternative to
launching US ICBMs before the Soviet attack was absolutely confirmed. On the
other hand, such a scenario is arguably unlikely, perhaps not worth such
elaborate precautions. Almost certainly, a nuclear war would be preceded by
unmistakably critical international tensions, such as a major war in Europe,
perhaps involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Under such
circumstances, a US President might find an attack by Soviet ICBMs sufficient
grounds for launching US ICBMs also. Even if he were not willing to launch
the ICBMs, and they were successfully destroyed by a surprise attack, US
bombers and submarines would remain capable of effective retaliation.
The present Administration has placed public emphasis on the idea that
nuclear war might be protracted over a period as long as six months. Rather
than a direct frontal assault on US ICBMs, the BMD system may have to contend
with a war of attrition in which critical system components were methodically
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reduced before US ICBMs were launched. For example, the Soviets could
systematically attack US early warning satellites and US early warning radars,
as well as the probe, interceptor, and Battle Manager sites of the BMD
system. Such actions might make US ICBMs progressively more vulnerable
without being sufficient to provoke their launch.
On the other hand, since they are relatively reliable for hard target
kill, US ICBMs are likely to be expended relatively early in a nuclear
exchange, thus leaving the BMD system nothing to defend.
Unquestionably, a defense of US ICBMs, if it were reliable, would make a
significant contribution to deterrence. Nevertheless, it would not completely
nullify Soviet ICBMs unless the Soviets chose to launch them futilely against
an impenetrable defense. Instead, the Soviets might choose other more
vulnerable US targets for their ICBMs. BMD therefore only partially avoids
the destruction of nuclear war through deterrence; should deterrence fail, BMD
may merely divert the destruction elsewhere.
The exo system currently envisioned would defend only ICBM sites. The
defense of other targets must also be considered. Of particular importance is
whether an exo system for ICBM defense could be expanded into an area defense
system, especially in view of President Reagan's endorsement of defenses
against ballistic missile attacks. Some view this possibility with
satisfaction as the ultimate goal of BMD; others view it with alarm as a
threat to arms control. In judging this issue, it is necessary to have a
clear definition of what is meant by "area defense". In its simplest sense,
area defense implies a system with sufficient range to protect large regions
rather than single hard targets. Endoatmospheric systems such as LoADS lack
the range for area defense, while exo systems necessarily have the range to
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satisfy this requirement. However, area defense further suggests that a
system is sufficiently reliable to protect population centers from nuclear
attack. This requirement is much more difficult to meet even if a system has
adequate range.
If the Spartan missile is representative of future exo interceptors, one
interceptor base could defend a region with a radius of several hundred square
kilometers. By increasing the effective range of the interceptor, this
defense coverage could in principle be increased (at some expense). However,
as noted earlier, providing greater coverage forces the defense to commit its
interceptors while the attacking RVs are at greater range. This as much as
the performance of the interceptor itself will probably limit the coverage to
be achieved from one interceptor site.
A single exo interceptor site defending an MX missile deployment, or two
sites defending a large fraction of the Minuteman force, would therefore be
able to cover only a small part of the continental US. To extend coverage to
all the US would require perhaps a dozen additional interceptor sites, in a
pattern comparable to the deployments proposed earlier for Sentinel or
Safeguard. One could argue therefore that one or two exo interceptor sites
would not and could not constitute a credible area defense. Although
additional sites could be deployed for an area defense after the initial sites
were installed, the new deployment would require several years (and
considerable expense) to construct.
More importantly, the performance which can be realistically expected of
an exo system falls far short of what would be needed for "area defense" in
the larger sense. It is generally conceded even by BMD advocates22 that
because of the devastating consequences of only a few RV leakers, population
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defense is not feasible for the foreseeable future. Nothing in the proposed
exo system justifies modifying that conclusion. On the contrary, in order to
defend even hardened ICBM silos where leakage could be tolerated on a
statistical basis, the exo system probably would require the support of an
endo system which would be ineffectual for area or population defense.
For these reasons, it is highly questionable whether a small exo system
deployed to defend ICBMs could be expanded into an area defense. Nevertheless,
fears are often voiced that even a strictly limited point defense system will
be perceived by the other side as an incipient "breakout" into an area
defense. Precedents for such an extrapolation exist: US analysts have been
fearful that the Soviet SA-5 high-altitude aircraft interceptor could be used
in an ballistic missile defense role.23 Perceptions often outdistance
reality in the arms race. The US could find itself in the frustrating
position of possessing an exo BMD system that others perceive as presenting an
unintended threat which the system is unable to fulfill.
Opponents of BMD sometimes suggest that a BMD system could be used in
support of a first strike. A nation possessing such a system might be tempted
to believe that it could launch a pre-emptive attack on its opponent's nuclear
forces, because the BMD system would further reduce the effectiveness of any
retaliatory attack the opponent might be able to develop after absorbing a
first strike. The BMD system could be brought to a much higher state of
readiness in anticipation of this role than if it languished for years in
expectation of an unlikely surprise attack. Rather than reducing the risk of
nuclear war by deterring opponents, a BMD system would, according to this
argument, make war more likely by making its possessor overconfident.
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From a technical point of view, it is hard to endorse this idea. BMD
systems are intended to defend fixed ICBM missile sites, but these missiles
are precisely the ones most likely to be used as part of a first strike.
After a first strike was launched, the BMD system would be left to defend
mostly empty silos. More importantly, any nation launching a first strike
must accept that a retaliatory attack could be directed against soft civilian
targets instead of military targets. A BMD system deployed to defend missile
silos would be poorly situated to cope with such retaliation. Any
endoatmospheric defense would be totally out of range, and (for reasons
already discussed) an exoatmospheric BMD system would not provide much
protection even if the opponent's forces were seriously diminished. No
informed national leader could realistically contemplate a first strike in the
expectation that a BMD system would prevent decisive retaliation.
Whatever its utility, the most striking characteristic of this
hypothetical exo defense system is its complexity. Successful operation
requires the proper performance of many components, each of which will strain
the state-of-the-art in its field. It is questionable whether such a system
can ever be made convincingly reliable.
Proponents argue that other high-technology systems have already
demonstrated the reliability of complex technology. Space programs are often
cited in support of this claim. However, success in space operations often
depends on conditions which are different from those faced by BMD. Space
operations take place as the culmination of years of increasingly intense
preparation, whereas BMD may be required to operate on short notice after
years of dormancy. Space operations are routinely tolerant of significant
delays when technical problems arise, while BMD would be required to perform
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instantly and completely on demand. Space operations typically take place
over long periods of time. If problems arise, human engineers can often
rearrange operations to salvage the mission. BMD operations would take place
within an interval of less than half an hour, leaving no time for human
intervention to overcome problems as they arise. Most importantly, space
systems are not required to operate in the unprecedented environment of a
nuclear war.
Exo BMD also differs from other high technology projects in its apparent
lack of redundancy. The failure of any of the many key components of the
system (such as early warning, tracking, discrimination, etc.) would lead to
the collapse of the system as a whole. Nuclear power reactors (not now
enjoying a reputation for reliability) offer an instructive contrast. The
isolation of the reactor fuel from the environment is preserved by three
separate components: the fuel cladding, the reactor vessel with its associated
cooling system, and the containment structure, each of which is engineered as
if it alone were the ultimate line of defense against nuclear release. The
complexity of a nuclear power plant is in parallel, offering redundancy and
therefore reliability, while the complexity of exo BMD is in series, with
little opportunity for redundancy.
A consequence of this questionable reliability is that exo BMD threatens
much more than it promises. Therefore, the deployment of a defense system
with uncertain reliability and capability is a powerful spur to arms
escalation. Whether or not exo BMD is reliable, the offense would feel
obliged to take it seriously and to plan some expansion of its strategic
capabilities in response. On the other hand, if exo BMD is not convincingly
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reliable, the defense would still feel obliged to expand its strategic
capabilities to compensate for the system's deficiencies.
The exo BMD scenario may be taken as an instructive example of the
well-known last move fallacy. It incorporates the implicit assumption that
the offense can do little or nothing to overcome the defense system's
innovations, so that the defense in effect has the last move in the
competition. The last move fallacy has ironic precedents in the history of
ABM and BMD. When the Sentinel and Safeguard systems were announced, critics
pointed out specific technical vulnerabilities in the proposed systems.
Population centers would be almost impossible to defend to the level
required. The small number of powerful of powerful radars would be vulnerable
to a concentrated attack. Decoys might distract the radars, or the radars
might be blinded by thermonuclear fireballs from offensive warheads or even
from the warheads carried by the defensive interceptors. At the time, ABM
proponents conceded none of these issues, arguing implicitly that these
problems were not significant. In other words, the defense would have the
last move. Now, even BMD proponents freely accept that all of these
difficulties would have rendered either Sentinel or Safeguard unworkable.
The new exo system has been specifically structured to overcome these
difficulties. Population defense has been abandoned in favor of hard target
defense. Fixed radars have been replaced by lofted optical sensors. Infrared
discrimination reduces the distraction of decoys, and non-nuclear kill avoids
the effects of exoatmospheric fireballs. Still, the offense has several
options for its next move after an exo deployment. Defending a small number
of hard targets makes it possible for the offense simply to saturate the
defense. The probes might be attacked at their bases or while aloft,
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discrimination could be foiled by lightweight but sophisticated decoys, and
the offense might choose to detonate its own exoatmospheric explosions. While
overcoming the problems of the last generation of defense systems, the new exo
system fails to anticipate the problems of the next generation.
Nevertheless, the last move fallacy is an avoidable pitfall. There are
in fact cases where strategic systems have preserved their intrinsic
advantages. When it was perceived that surface facilities for launching
missiles would be vulnerable to nuclear attack, ICBMs were based in hardened
underground silos which would be invulnerable except for highly accurate
attacks. It was anticipated that the accuracy required to destroy hardened
silos would be unavailable for a considerable time, and in fact only recently
has it been suggested that the security of the silos is questionable.
Similarly, missiles were based aboard nuclear submarines in the expectation
that locating submarines in the open ocean would remain difficult
indefinitely, and there is still no evidence that submarine-based missiles
will become vulnerable for the foreseeable future. These examples are meant
to show that it is possible to predict future technical developments in
strategic systems and to take advantage of these projections.
Inevitably, the question will be asked: "Would it work?" To this
question there is a hierarchy of answers, corresponding to a hierarchy of ways
in which the question can be more accurately phrased:
1) Can a non-nuclear kill vehicle intercept and destroy a ballistic
re-entry vehicle?
2) Can an exo defense system intercept and destroy a large number of
re-entry vehicles in a co-ordinated attack?
- 81 -
3) Can an exo defense system preserve a selected group of targets (such
as ICBMs) against a particular kind of attack?
4) Can the defended targets be preserved against a variety of realistic
attacks, so that ICBM survivability is restored?
5) Would a ballistic missile defense system contribute to a strategy of
assured survival, advocated by some?
Although no definitive exo system design will be available soon, the
evidence already presented suggests some answers to these questions:
1) The accuracy required for non-nuclear kill places far greater demands
on interceptor guidance than the accuracy required for nuclear intercepts with
the earlier Spartan system. The metaphor of hitting a bullet with a bullet
appears to be far more apt in this case. While BMD officials express strong
confidence that non-nuclear kill is feasible, doubts are understandable until
realistic tests such as HOE (and the Air Force test of its ASAT vehicle) can
be carried out to verify the predictions. At least this is one issue which
can be settled by actual demonstration.
2) Of course, non-nuclear kill is only one function of a complex system
which must successfully co-ordinate many functions to be able to detect,
identify, track, and destroy large numbers of attacking RVs. The difficulty
lies not so much in performing any one of these functions for any one
attacking RV, although each of these functions presents its own formidable
technical obstacles. (In particular, imaginative design of the offensive
weapons, especially in the use of decoys, might make an adequate defense
prohibitively expensive.) The challenge is to integrate all these functions
so that the system as a whole is reliable in the face of the unprecedented
circumstances of a large sophisticated nuclear attack. Whether this could be
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accomplished at all is open to doubt; what is even more doubtful is whether
the US could maintain confidence in such a system as a credible defense in
such circumstances.
3) The scenario usually envisioned for an exo BMD system is the defense
of ICBM silos in the event of a pre-emptive ICBM attack. If the number of
targets (i.e., ICBM silos) is limited, the offense may find it feasible simply
to overwhelm the defense. Although it may be possible to enhance the defense
in order to offset an increase in the offensive threat, other options such as
deceptive basing of the defended targets or negotiated limits on offensive
weapons may prove to be more attractive means of maintaining a credible
defense.
4) Even if an exo system could ward off a large pre-emptive attack by
ICBMs, the defended targets would remain vulnerable to other kinds of
attacks. The USSR may choose to develop accurate SLBMs which could destroy
ICBM silos with little warning, in spite of the exo system which might be
impotent against such attacks. An extended ICBM attack may suppress the early
warning system or exhaust the supply of probes and interceptors, leaving the
ICBM silos vulnerable. In the absence of continental air defense, the USSR
could conceivably destroy ICBM silos with long-range bombers or even cruise
missiles, although not without considerable delay and warning.
At best, therefore, a defense of ICBM silos could buy time, although
perhaps not very much time. To avoid losing its ICBM capabilities, the US
might be obliged to use them on short notice. Although many BMD proponents
loudly deprecate a policy of launching ICBMs under attack (LUA) and advocate
BMD as a means for avoiding LUA, in fact the ultimate source of credibility
for exo BMD may be the threat of LUA if the defense system fails.
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Finally, it should be obvious that BMD systems of the type considered
here are totally irrelevant to a strategy of assured survival. The mission of
an exo system would be to protect ICBM silos, some of which (unlike civilian
targets) could be sacrificed selectively. Even then, a credible exo system
would need the support of an endoatmospheric defense which, although it may be
effective for hard target defense, would be unsuitable for defending soft
targets such as cities. The exo system could defend only a fraction of the
total area of the US surrounding the ICBM fields, and this region is unlikely
to include large metropolitan centers. Curiously enough, the best that BMD
could hope to achieve is the preservation of the US assured destruction
capability.
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VII. Conclusions
Some important conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of
exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense:
1) Many of the components of the system are not available, and some will
not be available for at least a decade. Of course, many of the component
problems will undoubtably be solved, including perhaps some which currently
appear to be insurmountable. However, when they will be solved, or whether
they can all be solved, is unpredictable.
2) No integrated system has been designed, nor could any design be
considered seriously until many of the component development problems are
solved.
3) A very large BMD deployment, including both exo and endo systems,
would be required to preserve even a small fraction of US ICBMs from a
determined Soviet attack.
4) While the Soviets already have a large inventory of ICBMs, to which
they can add, the US must build a BMD system from scratch.
5) The USSR is likely to adopt specific countermeasures against an exo
defense. These could include pindown attacks (particularly by SLBMs) on
probe and interceptor sites, nuclear precursors against probes and
interceptors, or beam weapon attacks on the critical probes.
6) Reliance on passive infrared discrimination burdens the defense with
serious technical problems while it allows the offense to develop simple,
lightweight, but effective exo decoys.
7) An exoatmospheric battle is not likely to remain non-nuclear. The
offense naturally would be willing to detonate nuclear precursors in support
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of its nuclear attack, and in these circumstances the defense would have
little reluctance to detonate large nuclear warheads within dense groups of
RVs.
8) Because of its questionable reliability, an exo defense would
probably be supported ultimately by a launch-under-attack (LUA) policy.
9) A BMD deployment would probably contribute to the arms spiral.
Because the US could not be sure it would work, and because the Soviets could
not be sure it would not work, each side would tend to expand its strategic
forces even further.
10) Survivability of the ICBM force (or any other comparable set of fixed
targets) will probably require a combination of three factors: (a) a
proliferation of target points (through, for example, mobile or deceptive
basing), (b) a limitation on strategic weapons, or (c) ballistic missile
defense.
11) An exo system deployed to defend ICBMs could not easily be expanded
into an area defense. Range limitations and the relatively easy penetrability
of the system make it technically unsuited for such a purpose. General
perceptions about a BMD deployment, in contrast with technical considerations,
are an entirely different matter.
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Appendix
Computing the Performance of an Exo System Against Decoys
In his analysis of the BMD option for MX basing (for the OTA Report ),
Ashton Carter alluded to a calculation of the performance of exoatmospheric
BMD. He used this calculation to estimate the number of BMD interceptors
required to preserve a minimum number of Minuteman silos from a hypothetical
Soviet attack. Carter's calculation is reconstructed here, and is extended to
include the effect of decoys.
Assume that the overall efficiency of the exo system is characterized by
the probability P0 that a given re-entry vehicle (RV) will be destroyed
before it re-enters the atmosphere. In the absence of decoys, this
corresponds to the probability PK that the defense can perform a successful
intercept of an RV (P = P K). Assume also that the exo system is
supported by an independent endo system which defends individual point targets
against RVs which "leak" through the exo system. The endo system can destroy
one leaker with probability P1, and it can also destroy a second leaker with
probability P2 . Finally, assume that the Soviets target N RVs against each
defended hard target.
The probability for survival of a defended target is then obtained
through the binomial probability distribution. The probability that all N RVs
are destroyed is simply PN. The probability that one of the N RVs leaks
through the exo system is N'PNl~ (1-P ), but this leaker may be0 0'
intercepted by the endo system with probability P . Similarly, the
probability for two leakers is 1/2 'N'(N-1)PN-2.(-P0) 2, but
both leakers may be intercepted by the endo system with probability
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P IP2. In the event of three or more leakers, the defense will be
overwhelmed and the target will be destroyed. (No adjustment is made for the
intrinsic reliability of the RVs as this is probably quite high.) Therefore,
the probability that the target survives is
N 0 -1 1 -2P= P + N -P (iP)P + i N(N-1) P (I- PO) P PS a 1 ~ o 1 1~
S((N-)(- Po)
= I P (+ 0P, (0 + PI)
op 2PP
(Carter's Formula).
Several simple observations can be drawn from this formula about system
performance as a function of its parameters. First, as exo efficiency P0 is
reduced, the survival probability is reduced increasingly rapidly (whenever N
is greater than one), as Carter showed in the OTA report. This non-linear
behavior means that unless the system can reliably meet a minimum level of
efficiency, there is a danger that the system could be overwhelmed in an
actual engagement where P0 was not quite as large as expected. Second, as
the number N of attacking RVs increases, the system becomes more sensitive to
the efficiency Po. In an open-ended arms race between offense and defense,
progressively more defense is required to offset an increment in offense. The
cost-exchange ratio (however it is defined) is therefore a dynamic rather than
a static quantity, becoming less favorable as the threat increases. Third, as
either the number of attacking RVs increases or the overlay efficiency
diminishes, the probability of survival P5 becomes increasingly dependent on
the second and third terms in Carter's formula relative to the first term.
Consequently, the performance of the defense as a whole becomes more dependent
on the effective performance of the supporting endoatmospheric defense
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system. In contrast to a self-sufficient endo system such as LoADS in an MPS
role, which could succeed in its mission of exacting a significant penalty
from the attacker even if it met only a moderate threshold of performance, an
endo system in support of the exo system must be made as efficient as possible.
The effect of decoys on system performance may be incorporated into the
system efficiency, P 0. The exo system may fail with probability (-Po ) in
either of two ways: the system may fail to recognize a true RV and allow it to
leak through unchallenged, or the system may fail to destroy a recognized RV.
Let the probabil ity that the system recognizes an individual RV be PR* The
event tree for the exo system is then
no 4 recogni.e.d o+
RV R ~ Ov--It ofJe~r1(
recognized p
cles+roye.d
The combined probability of failure is
(1-P0 ) = (1-PR) + PR K = 1 - PR PK
so the overlay efficiency with decoys included is P0 = PR PK
The exo system must allow some leakage because too many interceptors
woul d be needed to attack all the decoys as well as all the real RVs. The
defense must try to economize the number of KVs required to perform its
mission, first by maximizing the discrimination between RVs and decoys, and
second by tolerating the leakage of a calculated fraction of the RVs.
To perform discrimination between RVs and decoys, the system makes
several measurements of the optical (and perhaps other) properties of the
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unknown objects. The various measurements can be combined, in principle at
least, to produce one numerical index which characterizes an individual
object. If this index exceeds a specified threshold, the system regards that
object as an RY to be attacked; if the index is less than the threshold, the
object is regarded as a decoy to be ignored.
Objectively, the indices for both RVs and decoys will be distributed
randomly, each with a corresponding probability density function. It is
common to assume that these two probability density functions will be
gaussian. Almost certainly the index can be constructed so that the gaussian
assumption is a good approximation; in the absence of real data it is at least
an instructive example. The probability density for either RVs or decoys is
given by
RD R,D
where/ R and/AD are the means of the distributions for RVs and decoys,
respectively, and O'R and T~D are the corresponding standard deviations.
The two distributions then have the following appearance:
ProbabiliY RVs Decoys
Densi+y
,AR xt #D tWiscrim~Itoi+n Inctex
The system designer is free to pick a threshold xt that arbitrarily
determines which objects will be attacked as RVs . In the example shown, the
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system would attack the large fraction of the RV population to the left of the
threshold. It would also attack the small fraction of the decoy population to
the left of the threshold. While ignoring the large fraction of the decoys to
the right of the threshold, the system allows a small fraction of the RVs to
leak through.
Naturally, discrimination is more successful if the defense can further
separate the two distributions by improving its observations of the attack.
Conversely, the offense attempts to confuse the two distributions, most
obviously by reducing the separation between the two means (that is, by making
the decoys a better imitation of the RVs), but also by attempting to enlarge
the standard deviations T~R and T'D (in effect, by making the nominal
appearances of both RVs and decoys less specifically defined).
The parameter K is a measure of the separation of the two distributions
which often appears in official discussions of exo BMD. When the two standard
deviations are equal (0'R = it is defined as
R,D
The figure has been drawn with a value of K = 2; that is, the means of the
distributions are separated by 2 standard deviations.
It is immediately obvious that system performance will be sensitive to
the selection of the threshold xt, particularly when, as illustrated, the
K parameter is about 2. Because few leakers can be tolerated, the threshold
must be much greater than /-R (xt>/4 R). In this region,
the RV distribution is low so that only a few more RVs can be included if the
threshold is increased further. However, because the decoy distribution in
this region is large, a small change in the threshold represents a major
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change in the number of decoys mistaken for RVs. Therefore, in- order to
increase the overlay efficiency (P0 ) slightly, the defense must expend many
more KVs, most of which will be deployed against decoys (wastage).
The number NK of KVs required per target defended is given by
N K= N P R DP)
where again N is the number of attacking RVs, PR is the probability that an
RV will be recognized and attacked, PD is the probability that a decoy will
be attacked, and D is the number of decoys accompanying each RV. Since the
defense cannot be perfect, some defended targets will be lost to leakage. If
the probability for survival of the target is PS, then in order to preserve
N. targets (in the mean), the defense system (exo and endo together) must
defend N , targets, where N is given by
P
Consequently, a better measure of KV economy is the number of KVs required per
surviving target:
NR .- (P R D P .
Clearly, the total number of KVs required is then
T=kIsR
(The above equations are based on the assumption that only one KV is
deployed against each object identified as an RV. If the kill probability
PK of each KV is low, the defense might choose to deploy more than one KV
against some or all such objects. If the defense simply chooses to deploy
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two KVs against each object, then the number of KVs required is obviously
doubled. In this situation, KV economy deteriorates so rapidly that an exo
defense system may be unattractive anyway.)
The probabilities PR and PD are clearly the accumulations of their
respective probability density distributions to the left of the threshold
x . These are obtained in this example by integrating over the gaussian
distribution as follows
R (Xe) I P:2 (x) cIX
R D t /IA RDD
2.a-,)D
This result includes the well-known error function, the properties of which
are summarized in Abramowitz and Stegun. 2
If the arguments of the error function are defined as
Q - Xt ~~ ,
R,.D
then one can easily show that the two arguments are related by the equations
T'D D
-a R (wken cr (7
R r2 R D >
where again K is the discrimination parameter. Where necessary, these
arguments can be obtained from their respective probabilities by inverting the
error function:
c1 R,D = erf~1 (2 PR,D ~ 1).
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The inverse of the error function is easily computed using the Newton-Raphson
technique for finding roots.
When = , the problem may always be re-scaled without loss of
generality so that (G =6 )= 1 and uE 0. Then K=1 D, and
p i(i2+eirf( ))
(The reversal of sign in the last step is made to keep the argument of the
error function positive and therefore within the domain of the applicable
numerical algorithms.)
*These results can be used to explore the sensitivity of the defense
system to its operating parameters. It is necessary first to specify the
following parameters:
a) the number of targets which must survive, NS;
b) the number of RVs threatening each target, N, and the number of
decoys accompanying each RV, D;
c) the performance of the supporting endo system, in terms of its
kill probabilities P1 and P2;
d) the kill probability for an individual KV, PK'
e) the ability of the system to discriminate between RVs and decoys,
in terms of the parameter K.
Then the threshold x can be varied systematically. For each value of x, the
following performance indicators can be calculated:
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a) the probabilities PR and PD
b) the probability of survival PS, and from it and Ns the number
ND of targets to be defended (preferentially);
c) the number of KVs required R per target preserved, and from it
and N5, the total number of KVs required T.
If the defense wishes to minimize the number of KVs required, the value
of x is chosen to minimize R. A larger value of x requires a larger number of
KVs to defend a smaller number of targets more vigorously, while a smaller
value of x again requires a larger number of KVs, this time to defend more
targets less vigorously.
The model just described is meant only to be instructive, and should be
regarded with caution. Simplifying assumptions have been made and many
complications which might be included have been neglected. More importantly,
the conclusions obtained from the model depend critically on the system
parameters, and literally none of these can be specified definitely until the
Soviet threat is better known and until a real defense system is designed.
Nevertheless, the model can be used to set minimum requirements for a credible
exo system.
